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The Development of Intellectual Disabilities 
in United States Capital Cases and the 
Modern Application of Moore v. Texas to 
State Court Decisions 
Dr. Alexander Updegrove 
16 U. MASS. L. REV. 2 
ABSTRACT 
Although in 1989 the Supreme Court of the United States initially held that the Eighth 
Amendment did not prohibit executing persons with intellectual disabilities in Penry 
v. Lynaugh, in 2002 it subsequently reversed this decision in Atkins v. Virginia, citing 
changing state legislation. Since the Atkins decision, state courts have interpreted the 
Court’s Atkins provisions in a variety of ways, some more faithfully than others. As a 
result, the Court provided additional clarification in its 2014 and 2015 Hall v. Florida 
and Brumfield v. Cain decisions, ruling that states must apply a Standard Error of 
Measurement of +5/-5 to all capital defendant IQ test scores. Despite this requirement, 
some state courts still delivered opinions contrary to the Court’s Atkins and Hall 
holdings, prompting the Court to offer yet more guidance in 2017. In Moore v. Texas 
I, the Court established that states must evaluate intellectual disabilities in capital 
defendants according to current medical standards, which include: (1) using the 
diagnostic criteria outlined in the DSM-5 or AAIDD-11; (2) focusing on adaptive 
deficits, not strengths; and (3) prohibiting determinations of intellectual disability from 
being based on functioning in prison. In 2019 the Court determined in Moore v. Texas 
II that the analysis undertaken by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals continued to 
offend Court precedent. Given the long history of some state courts disregarding clear 
holdings of the Supreme Court, this Article examines how state courts have interpreted 
Moore I and Moore II. 
AUTHOR’S NOTE 
Alexander H. Updegrove is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal 
Justice at the University of North Texas. His scholarship focuses on the death penalty 
and public perceptions of criminal justice issues. This Article is dedicated to Rolando 
V. del Carmen and Michael S. Vaughn. This Article is also dedicated to Peggy M. 
Tobolowsky, for her incredible legal scholarship on intellectual disability among 
persons sentenced to death. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment 
prohibited executing persons with intellectual disabilities in Atkins v. 
Virginia,1 subsequent state court interpretations of the case have 
compelled the Court to revisit aspects of the intellectual disability 
analysis on numerous occasions. One reason for this could be that the 
state courts must interpret the written opinions of the Court. This creates 
the possibility for errors as, inevitably, some state court opinions will 
adhere more closely to the Supreme Court’s principles in their 
interpretations than others. Misinterpretations by state courts may occur, 
sometimes due to genuine confusion, other times due to bad faith 
motivated by conflicting ideologies. When confronted with especially 
egregious interpretations from state courts, the Supreme Court is forced 
to intervene and provide clarification. Such was the case in Moore v. 
Texas I,2 where the Court ordered Texas to evaluate capital defendants 
for intellectual disabilities using current medical criteria rather than the 
nonmedical Briseno factors.3 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
(CCA) introduced the Briseno factors in 2004 based on the character 
Lennie Small from John Steinbeck’s fictional novel Of Mice and Men.4 
 
1 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
2 Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
3 Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), overruled by Moore 
I, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). The Briseno factors aid the factfinders’ assessment with 
guiding questions such as: “Did those who knew the person best during the 
developmental stage, his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities, think 
he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that 
determination?” Id. at 8. “Has the person formulated plans and carried them 
through or is his conduct impulsive?” Id. “Does his conduct show leadership or 
does it show that he is led around by others?” Id. “Is his conduct in response to 
external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially 
acceptable?” Id. “Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or 
written questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?” Id. “Can 
the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?” Id. And 
finally, “[p]utting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital 
offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and 
complex execution of purpose?” Id. at 8–9. 
4 See JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN (Penguin Books 1993) (1937) 
(Throughout the novel, Lennie Small is portrayed as a simple-minded person who 
enjoys petting soft materials. Being a large person, Lennie unintentionally kills 
several animals as a result of petting them. Toward the end of the novel, Lennie 
finds himself in a situation where he is provided a chance to pet the hair of his 
boss’s daughter-in-law. As with the animals, Lennie’s strength proves fatal.); see 
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After the Court remanded the case to the Texas CCA with instructions 
to reassess Moore’s intellectual ability in a manner consistent with 
Moore I, the Texas CCA again found him intellectually able, and 
therefore eligible for execution.5 On February 19, 2019, the Supreme 
Court determined that the Texas CCA had misinterpreted its earlier 
ruling.6 In order to prevent further misinterpretations, the Court held that 
Moore was intellectually disabled, and therefore entitled to execution 
relief.7 
This Article begins by reviewing relevant Supreme Court rulings on 
intellectual disabilities in capital cases. Part III then identifies state court 
cases from the twenty-eight death penalty states8 that have cited Moore 
v. Texas I or Moore v. Texas II to examine how state courts are 
interpreting and applying these Supreme Court cases. Special attention 
is given to state court cases that appear inconsistent with clear 
instructions from the Court on intellectual disabilities. Finally, this 
Article concludes by summarizing the issues raised by state courts post-
Moore I and classifying them in two categories: (1) issues the Court has 
clearly ruled on; and (2) issues requiring additional clarification from 
the Court. 
II. SUPREME COURT CASES ON INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES IN 
CAPITAL CASES 
A. Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth 
Amendment does not prohibit states from executing persons with 
 
also Julia Barton, Judging Steinbeck’s Lennie, LIFE OF THE LAW (Sept. 3, 2013), 
http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2013/09/judging-steinbeck-lennie/ 
[https://perma.cc/TD2Q-5TJL]. 
5 Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), rev’d, Moore v. Texas, 
139 S. Ct. 666 (2019). 
6 Moore v. Texas (Moore II), 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (per curiam). 
7 Id. at 668. 
8 See Death Penalty Information Center, States with and Without the Death 
Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
[https://perma.cc/P5ZP-BB78?type=image]. (The 28 states that still retain the 
death penalty are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.). 
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intellectual disabilities.9 Penry exhibited “an IQ between 50 and 63,” 
and the evidence presented suggested “that Penry suffered from organic 
brain damage” originating from either birth or “beatings and multiple 
injuries to the brain” experienced in his early childhood.10 State experts 
disputed some of the conclusions drawn by the defense, but conceded 
“that Penry was a person of extremely limited mental ability.”11 In its 
decision, the Court observed that a “rational juror” might “conclude that 
Penry was less morally” responsible for the crime in question because 
of his intellectual disability.12 The Court found that the jurors in Penry’s 
case lacked an opportunity to incorporate “the mitigating evidence of 
Penry’s mental retardation”13 into their sentencing decision.14 Thus, the 
case was remanded with instructions to hold a new sentencing hearing.15 
The Court proceeded to address whether it was cruel and unusual 
punishment to execute persons who have intellectual disabilities. In its 
opinion, the Court granted that “the common law prohibition against 
punishing ‘idiots’ for their crime suggests” that executing “profoundly 
or severely retarded” persons constitutes a cruel and unusual 
punishment.16 Nevertheless, the Court thought that “the protections 
afforded by the insanity defense” rendered the possibility of conviction 
or punishment “[un]likely.”17 Additionally, the Court had previously 
determined that states must afford “the insane” execution relief.18 The 
Court reasoned that because the trial court found Penry competent to 
stand trial,19 he did not meet the criteria for insanity detailed in Ford v. 
 
9 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
10 Id. at 307–09. 
11 Id. at 309. 
12 Id. at 322. 
13 Id. at 323. Based on a rule cited in the Federal Register by the Social Security 
Administration on August 1, 2013, the term “mental retardation” has now been 
changed to “intellectual disability.” Change in Terminology: “Mental 
Retardation” to “Intellectual Disability,” 78 Fed. Reg. 46499 (Aug. 1, 2013) (to 
be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416). The change took effect on September 3, 
2013. Id. 
14 Penry, 492 U.S. at 323. 
15 Id. at 340. 
16 Id. at 333. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 334 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986)). 
19 Id. at 333. 
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Wainwright.20 Furthermore, the trial jury did not deem Penry’s insanity 
claim credible.21 The Court declined to recognize a national consensus 
against executing persons with intellectual disabilities because at the 
time only two states had legislation outlawing the practice.22 In contrast, 
when the Court decided Ford, twenty-six states had legislation 
prohibiting the execution of insane persons.23 
In Penry, the Court considered whether executing persons with 
intellectual disabilities “would be cruel and unusual because it is 
disproportionate to [their] degree of personal culpability.”24 In doing so, 
the Court acknowledged that “[i]t is clear that mental retardation has 
long been regarded as a factor that may diminish an individual’s 
culpability for a criminal act.”25 The Court, however, held that while 
“the sentencing body must be allowed to consider mental retardation” 
as a mitigating circumstance, “the record before the Court” precluded a 
finding that all persons with intellectual disabilities “lack the cognitive, 
volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability 
associated with the death penalty.”26 The Court arrived at this decision 
because intellectual disabilities vary from person to person, and the 
current medical consensus at the time suggested that some of the 
adaptive deficits caused by intellectual disabilities could be improved in 
select individuals.27 While the Court described intellectual disability as 
“a factor that may well lessen a defendant’s culpability,” it declined to 
hold executing capital defendants with intellectual disabilities as 
 
20 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 412 (1986). When Justice Powell concurred 
with the plurality in Ford that the Eighth Amendment forbid executing “the 
insane,” he proposed defining insanity as “those who are unaware of the 
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Id. at 422 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
21 Penry, 492 U.S. at 310. 
22 Id. at 334. (Georgia and Maryland. Georgia’s law was already in effect at the time 
of Penry v. Lynaugh, while Maryland’s law was set to take effect on July 1, 1989.) 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 336. 
25 Id. at 337. 
26 Id. at 337–38. 
27 Id. at 338 (“[T]he consequences of a retarded person’s mental impairment, 
including the deficits in his or her adaptive behavior, ‘may be ameliorated through 
education and habilitation.’“ (quoting James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, 
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 424 n.54 
(1985))). 
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unconstitutional “by virtue of [a defendant’s] mental retardation 
alone.”28 
Justice Brennan concurred that states must provide jurors with an 
opportunity to consider “all mitigating evidence,” including claims of 
intellectual disability, before issuing a death sentence.29 Brennan 
disagreed with the majority in part because he thought that the Eighth 
Amendment required the Court to prohibit states from executing 
persons with intellectual disabilities. Specifically, Brennan contended 
that the Court had previously established the standard for determining 
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual in Solem v. Helm.30 In that 
case, the Court ruled that “the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty” must be weighed against each other when determining 
punishments.31 Alternatively, these two factors can be understood as 
“the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the 
culpability of the offender[,]” respectively.32 Since people with 
intellectual disabilities possess a lower degree of culpability, Brennan 
reasoned that the Court’s standard for assessing whether a punishment 
is cruel and unusual compelled a finding that intellectually disabled 
defendants must receive a sentence lighter than the ultimate punishment, 
death.33 
Brennan acknowledged that “[f]or many purposes, legal and 
otherwise, to treat the mentally retarded as a homogeneous group is 
inappropriate” because that classification creates “the risk of false 
stereotyping and unwarranted discrimination.”34 Nevertheless, the 
definition of intellectual disability supplied by then-current clinical 
manuals applied equally to whoever satisfied the qualifying criteria. 
Citing the clinical manual’s definition of intellectual disability, Brennan 
asserted that anyone who met the qualifying criteria exhibited 
subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive deficits. Based on this 
“clinical definition of mental retardation,” Brennan argued that the 
observed variation in intellectual disabilities cited by the majority was 
irrelevant because each still satisfied the criteria for intellectual 
 
28 Id. at 340. 
29 Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
30 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). 
31 Id. at 290–91. 
32 Id. at 292. 
33 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“death is different in kind from 
any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.”). 
34 Penry, 492 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
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disability.35 Additionally, while some individuals with a milder form of 
intellectual disability may “be quite capable of overcoming” adaptive 
deficits, clinical understandings of intellectual disabilities clarified that 
those individuals are still limited in their ability to operate in society.36 
With this in mind, Brennan concluded that: 
[t]he impairment of a mentally retarded offender’s reasoning 
abilities, control over impulsive behavior, and moral development 
in my view limits his or her culpability so that, whatever other 
punishment might be appropriate, the ultimate penalty of death is 
always and necessarily disproportionate to his or her 
blameworthiness and hence is unconstitutional.
37
 
Beyond this, Brennan argued that allowing jurors to consider 
defendants’ intellectual disabilities during the sentencing phase would 
not adequately protect them from death sentences.38 Worse yet, the 
practice of executing people with intellectual disabilities “does not 
measurably further the penal goals of either retribution or deterrence.”39 
Brennan expressed his view in light of the Court’s previous 
determination that, “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of 
the criminal offender.”40 Exempting from execution those who—by the 
very nature of their diagnosis—are unlikely to be deterred would not 
detract from the deterrent effect that the punishment has on the general 
population.41 
Justice Stevens wrote separately, agreeing with the majority that an 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against executing persons with 
intellectual disabilities, if ever established, should be applied 
retroactively.42 Stevens was ultimately persuaded by the brief submitted 
 
35 Id. at 345. 
36 Id. at 345–46. 
37 Id. at 346. 
38 Id. at 347. 
39 Id. at 348. 
40 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987). See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782, 800 (1982) (“As for retribution as a justification for executing [defendant], 
we think this very much depends on the degree of [defendant’s] culpability—what 
[defendant’s] intentions, expectations, and actions were.”). 
41 Penry, 492 U.S. at 347–49 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
42 Id. at 349 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
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by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR).43 In their 
brief, the AAMR addressed then-current medical understandings of 
intellectual disabilities and argued that according to those standards, it 
was “unconstitutional” to execute defendants with intellectual 
disabilities.44 
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority’s basic description of the 
case facts but rejected their reasoning for declining to exempt persons 
with intellectual disabilities from execution.45 Specifically, Scalia 
asserted that to trigger Eighth Amendment protections a punishment 
must be both “cruel and unusual.”46 Because the Court determined there 
was no national consensus against executing persons with intellectual 
disabilities, consideration of the issue should have stopped there.47 
Additionally, Scalia disagreed with the Court’s requirement that states 
provide jurors with an opportunity to consider a defendant’s alleged 
intellectual disabilities as a mitigating factor during the sentencing 
phase.48 
B. Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court again considered whether 
the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing persons with intellectual 
disabilities. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and noted that, 
“[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and 
control of their impulses,” persons with intellectual disabilities “do not 
act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious 
adult criminal conduct.”49 When discussing the details of the case, the 
Court noted that an expert for the defense reported Atkins’ IQ to be 59, 
therefore indicating an intellectual disability.50 In contrast, the state’s 
expert found Atkins intellectually able and suggested that he was 
actually suffering from antisocial personality disorder.51 This 
juxtaposition of diagnoses illustrates the Court’s finding that 
 
43 The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) is now the American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). 
44 Penry, 492 U.S. at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
45 Id. at 350–51 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
46 Id. at 351 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 351–52. 
49 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002). 
50 Id. at 308–09. 
51 Id. at 309. 
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“impairments [of intellectually disabled individuals] can jeopardize the 
reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against” them.52 
To determine whether a punishment is “excessive” the Court looks 
to “those [societal standards] that currently prevail” rather than those in 
existence at the enactment of the Bill of Rights.53 Therefore, the Court’s 
“proportionality review” must take place “under those evolving 
standards.”54 In the thirteen years since deciding Penry, the Court found 
that “the state legislative landscape” had experienced a “dramatic 
shift.”55 The shift was characterized by “the consistency of the direction 
of change” instead of the total number of states prohibiting the execution 
of intellectually disabled people.56 The Court considered “anticrime 
legislation” as “far more popular than legislation providing protections 
for persons guilty of violent crime.”57 Accordingly, the legislative shift 
was interpreted as “powerful evidence that today our society views 
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the 
average criminal.”58 Therefore, the Court concluded that “the 
practice . . . has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national 
consensus has developed against it.”59 
Having firmly established a constitutional protection for those with 
intellectual disabilities, the Court suggested that the dilemma faced by 
many states stemmed from “serious disagreement” over “which 
offenders [were] in fact” intellectually disabled.”60 Considering 
precedent on this issue, the Court saddled the states with “the task of 
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction 
upon [their] execution of sentences.”61 The Court further interpreted the 
national shift against executing persons with intellectual disabilities as 
evidence “that some characteristics of mental retardation undermine the 
strength of the procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence 
steadfastly guards.”62 Given the fact that people with intellectual 
 
52 Id. at 306–07. 
53 Id. at 311. 
54 Id. at 312. 
55 Id. at 310. 
56 Id. at 315. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 316. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 317. 
61 Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986)). 
62 Id. 
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disabilities “by definition” exhibit adaptive deficits, the Court 
determined that “[t]heir deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from 
criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.”63 
Pursuant to the Court’s reasoning, deterrence and retribution are two 
justifications for capital punishment, and according to retributive 
principles, “the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily 
depends on the culpability of the offender.”64 Because these principles 
are only served if less culpable capital defendants, such as those with 
intellectual disabilities, are given a sentence less severe than the death 
penalty, the Court found “an exclusion [from death] for the mentally 
retarded [to be] appropriate.”65 Similarly, regarding deterrence as a 
justification for capital punishment, the Court wrote that: 
it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make 
[intellectually disabled] defendants less morally culpable—for 
example, the diminished ability to understand and process 
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical 
reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that 
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a 




For this reason, the Court found that “executing the mentally retarded 
[would] not measurably further the goal of deterrence.”67 
Finally, the Court recognized an “enhanced” likelihood of people 
with intellectual disabilities receiving the death penalty rather than life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) during 
sentencing.68 This is largely due to the: 
possibility of false confessions, [and] . . . the lesser ability of 
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of 
mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more 
aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able 
to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor 
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted 




63 Id. at 318. 
64 Id. at 319. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 320. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 320–21. 
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Some jurors may assume that people with intellectual disabilities pose 
a greater risk of reoffending in the future and are therefore more 
deserving of death.70 In reality, intellectual disability lessens a 
defendant’s culpability and supports the argument for LWOP instead of 
death.71 
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, and framed the issue before the 
Court as “whether a national consensus deprives Virginia of the 
constitutional power to impose the death penalty on capital murder 
defendants” like Atkins.72 Contrary to the majority, Rehnquist did not 
acknowledge a national consensus against executing people with 
intellectual disabilities.73 Rehnquist argued that, rather than deciding the 
case according to stare decisis, the majority sought to justify “a post hoc 
rationalization for [its] subjectively preferred result . . . .”74 When 
deciding if a punishment is cruel and unusual, Rehnquist asserted that 
the Court should only consider “the work product of legislatures and 
sentencing jury determinations[.]”75 Therefore, he objected to instances 
where the Court relied upon public “opinion poll data”76 and 
international opposition to capital punishment.77 According to 
Rehnquist, the Court’s reasoning should have been informed by 
“comprehensive statistics” on “whether juries routinely consider death 
a disproportionate punishment for mentally retarded offenders.”78 
Similarly, Rehnquist criticized the Court for relying on opinions 
expressed by professional organizations, since those views did not 
reflect “the workings of normal democratic processes.”79 
Echoing Rehnquist’s reasoning, Justice Scalia began his dissent by 
contending that, “[s]eldom has an opinion of this Court rested so 
 
70 Id. at 321 (“As Penry demonstrated, moreover, reliance on mental retardation as 
a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that 
the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury. 492 U.S. 
302, 323–25 (1989). Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special 
risk of wrongful execution.”). 
71 Id. at 319–21. 
72 Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
73 Id. at 321–22. 
74 Id. at 322. 
75 Id. at 324. 
76 Id. at 322. 
77 Id. at 324. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 326. 
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obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.”80 He 
argued that a punishment is cruel and unusual only if: (1) it violates the 
standards that existed when Congress enacted the Bill of Rights; or (2) 
it violates contemporary understandings of decency, as primarily 
determined by state statutes.81 From Scalia’s perspective, the majority 
failed to demonstrate that executing people with intellectual disabilities 
violated 18th century standards of decency in the United States.82 He 
wrote that the majority “[paid] lipservice” to previous Court decisions 
while “miraculously extract[ing] a ‘national consensus’ forbidding 
execution of the mentally retarded” from state statutes in eighteen of the 
thirty-eight death penalty states.83 Scalia was critical of the majority’s 
ruling based on statutes that were “still in [their] infancy.”84 For him, 
the majority’s opinion rested on “embarrassingly feeble evidence.”85 
Historically, all states permitted the execution of people with 
intellectual disabilities. In 1988—14 years prior to Atkins—Georgia 
became the first state to prohibit executing citizens who were 
intellectually disabled.86 Scalia therefore discounted the majority’s 
conclusion that states were trending toward prohibiting the practice, 
writing, “in what other direction could we possibly see change?”87 
Instead, he felt the Court was “thrashing about for evidence of 
‘consensus’ . . . .”88 and argued that the majority relied on a “grab bag 
of reasons” to justify its categorical ban against executing defendants 
with intellectual disabilities.89 Therefore, he refuted both the majority’s 
claim that retribution and deterrence would not be served by executing 
such individuals, and its assertion of an increased likelihood of 
intellectually disabled defendants receiving a sentence of death rather 
 
80 Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. at 339–40. 
82 Id. at 340. 
83 Id. at 342. 
84 Id. at 344. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (referencing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2017)). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 346. 
89 Id. at 352. As a result of their efforts, and for basing the opinion on the consensus 
of professional organizations, Scalia awarded the majority the “Prize for the 
Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus.’” Id. at 347. Absent 
what he considered compelling evidence, Scalia accused the majority of 
manufacturing a “contrived consensus.” Id. at 349. 
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than LWOP.90 Scalia concluded that tying the definition of intellectual 
disabilities to medical diagnostic criteria was problematic because “the 
symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned.”91 
C. Hall v. Florida (2014) 
In Hall v. Florida, the Court addressed whether the definition of 
intellectual disability that Florida used in capital cases was 
unconstitutional.92 Florida’s statute stipulated that if a defendant scored 
above 70 on every IQ test, “all further exploration of intellectual 
disabilit[ies] [was] foreclosed.”93 For the majority, Justice Kennedy 
noted that Hall “presented substantial and unchallenged evidence of 
intellectual disabilit[ies]”94—specifically, he demonstrated several 
“deficits in adaptive functioning.”95 Hall’s scores from nine IQ tests, 
administered over a forty-year period, were submitted as further proof 
of his intellectual disabilities.96 The scores ranged between 60 and 80, 
and two results fell below 70.97 The trial court rejected the IQ scores 
below 70 for “evidentiary reasons,” leaving Hall with seven IQ scores 
ranging from 71 to 80.98 Because Hall’s minimum IQ score of 71 
surpassed the statutory floor of 70, Florida law classified him as a person 
without intellectual disabilities and eligible for execution.99 
At the outset of the opinion, the Court reaffirmed that: (1) “[n]o 
legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person with 
intellectual disabilit[ies]”; and (2) “to impose the harshest of 
punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her 
 
90 Id. at 351–52. 
91 Id. at 353. 
92 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014). 
93 Id. (referencing FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2013) invalidated by Hall v. Florida, 572 
U.S. 701 (2014)). 
94 Id. at 705. 
95 Id. at 706 (“[A]n individual’s ability or lack of ability to adapt or adjust to the 
requirements of daily life, and success or lack of success in doing so, is central to 
the framework followed by psychiatrists and other professionals in diagnosing 
intellectual disabilit[ies].”). The Court noted that Hall’s adaptive deficits were 
exasperated by a rough home life, where his mother repeatedly subjected him to 
physical abuse for displaying symptoms that originated from those adaptive 
deficits. Id. 
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inherent dignity as a human being.”100 Moreover, the Court reasoned 
that deterrence is not effectuated because “those with intellectual 
disability are, by reason of their condition, likely unable to make the 
calculated judgments that are the premise for the deterrence 
rationale.”101 Similarly, “[t]he diminished capacity of the intellectually 
disabled lessens moral culpability and hence the retributive value of the 
punishment.”102 The Court highlighted a third reason for prohibiting the 
execution of intellectually disabled people: “to protect the integrity of 
the trial process.”103 As the Court recognized, those with intellectual 
disabilities “are more likely to give false confessions, are often poor 
witnesses, and are less able to give meaningful assistance to their 
counsel.”104 Accordingly, these individuals “may not . . . receive the 
law’s most severe sentence.”105 
When deciding Hall, the Court observed that “it is proper to consider 
the psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose 
and meaning of IQ scores . . . .”106 These sources serve as the starting 
point of consideration, as the Court “must express its own independent 
determination reached in light of the instruction found in those sources 
and authorities.”107 To that end, the Court is “informed by the work of 
medical experts” when “determining intellectual disabilit[ies].”108 
Consequently, when a court is “determining who qualifies as 
intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical community’s 
opinions.”109 Given that the average IQ test score is 100, a standard 
deviation is “approximately 15 points,” and two standard deviations 
below the average is considered abnormal, an abnormal score is defined 
as “a score of approximately 70 points.”110 According to the Court, 
Florida’s statute erred by interpreting IQ scores above 70 as absolute 
proof that a defendant was not intellectually disabled.111 In contrast, “the 
 
100 Id. at 708. 






107 Id. at 710. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 711. 
111 Id. at 712. 
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medical community” required evaluating defendants for signs of 
adaptive deficits even in cases where they “ha[d] an IQ test score above 
70.”112 
The Court considered Florida’s statute to have “disregard[ed] 
established medical practice in two interrelated ways.”113 First, the 
statute viewed “an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a 
defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would 
consider other evidence.”114 Second, “[t]he professionals who design, 
administer, and interpret IQ tests [contend] that IQ test scores should be 
read not as a single fixed number but as a range.”115 This range, known 
as the Standard Error of Measurement (SEM), is “a reflection of the 
inherent imprecision of the [IQ] test itself.”116 Proper administration of 
IQ testing, therefore, recognizes “that an individual’s score is best 
understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score.”117 
Florida’s statute posed a problem because the evaluators who diagnose 
intellectual disabilities in Florida did not “consider factors indicating 
whether [a defendant] had deficits in adaptive functioning” after “the 
SEM [was] applie[d] and the individual’s IQ score [was] 75 or 
below.”118 In its rationale, the Court noted, “every state legislature to 
have considered the issue after Atkins—save Virginia’s—and whose 
law has been interpreted by its courts has taken a position contrary to 
that of Florida.”119 This fact was “strong evidence of consensus that our 
society does not regard this strict cutoff [of a score of 70 or lower on an 
IQ test in order to qualify as intellectually disabled] as proper or 
humane.”120 
In one of its most instructive statements, the Court wrote that “Atkins 
did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope” of 
the prohibition against executing intellectually disabled defendants.121 
Referencing then-current medical diagnostic criteria, “[t]he Atkins 
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express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at 70.”122 
Consequently, “[t]he clinical definitions of intellectual disabilit[ies], 
which take into account that IQ scores represent a range, not a fixed 
number, were a fundamental premise of Atkins.”123 If this were not the 
case, and “the States were to have complete autonomy to define 
intellectual disabilit[ies] as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins 
could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of 
human dignity would not become a reality.”124 
Based on this reasoning, the Court held that Florida’s “rigid 
rule . . . create[d] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual 
disabilit[ies would] be executed, and thus [was] unconstitutional.”125 In 
reaching its holding, the Court “placed substantial reliance on the 
expertise of the medical profession.”126 According to the Court, “this 
determination [was] informed by the views of medical experts [whose] 
views do not dictate the Court’s decision, yet the Court does not 
disregard these informed assessments.”127 Thus, “[t]he legal 
determination of intellectual disabilit[ies] is distinct from a medical 
diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic 
framework.”128 Within a legal context, this means “when a defendant’s 
IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin 
of error, the defendant must be [given the opportunity] to present 
additional evidence of intellectual disabilit[ies], including testimony 
regarding adaptive deficits.”129 The Hall Court asserted that 
“[i]ntellectual disability is a condition not a number” and cautioned 
against finding “a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and 
interrelated assessment.”130 The Court asserted “[t]he death penalty is 
the gravest sentence our society may impose,” and the Florida statute 
was arbitrary in that “Florida seeks to execute a man because he scored 
a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ test.”131 
 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 720. 
124 Id. at 720–21. 
125 Id. at 704. 
126 Id. at 722. 
127 Id. at 721. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 723. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 724. 
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Justice Alito dissented, interpreting Atkins as “not mandat[ing] the 
use of a single method for identifying” people with intellectual 
disabilities.132 Alito accused the majority as now requiring a single 
method for assessing intellectual disabilities that was “largely [based] 
on the positions adopted by private professional associations.”133 Many 
of his objections concerned the distinction between evolving “standards 
of American society as a whole” and “evolving standards of 
professional societies.”134 Alito believed that Eighth Amendment 
considerations hinged on the former, while the majority relied on the 
latter to invalidate Florida’s statute.135 He also understood the Atkins 
Court to have established a strict three-prong definition of intellectual 
disability based on then-current medical diagnostic criteria.136 
According to Alito, the failure to meet even one of those criteria, such 
as an IQ score at or below 70, should prohibit the state from finding that 
a defendant has an intellectual disability regardless of whether they 
satisfied the other two prongs.137 
 
132 Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
133 Id. at 725. He argued that this approach was “most unwise” and “likely to result 
in confusion.” Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. Alito contended that the majority failed to demonstrate a national consensus 
among state statutes requiring the use of the SEM for IQ tests. Id. at 728–29. 
Instead, Alito thought that “[t]he fairest assessment of the current situation is that 
the States have adopted a multitude of approaches to a very difficult question.” 
Id. at 730. He elaborated: “[u]nder our modern Eighth Amendment cases, what 
counts are our society’s standards—which is to say, the standards of the American 
people—not the standards of professional associations, which at best represents 
the views of a small professional elite.” Id. at 731. 
136 Id. at 727. 
137 Id. He also dissented because when defendants presented IQ scores above 70 but 
at or below 75, the majority did not require additional evidence of the first prong 
(as assessed by IQ score), but instead required evidence aimed at the second prong 
(adaptive deficits). Id. at 735–36. Alito interpreted this to mean that “even when 
a defendant has failed to show that he meets the first prong . . . evidence of the 
second prong . . . can establish intellectual disabilit[ies].” Id. at 736. According to 
Alito, this approach was flawed because “[s]trong evidence of a deficit in adaptive 
behavior does not necessarily demonstrate a deficit in intellectual functioning [the 
first prong]. And without the latter, a person simply cannot be classified as 
intellectually disabled.” Id. at 737. Furthermore, prioritizing evidence of adaptive 
deficits, he warned, would “produce inequities in the administration of capital 
punishment” because no two individuals would have the same degree of adaptive 
deficits. Id. 
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The dissent identified several problems created by the majority’s 
approach which require “legislative judgments, not judicial 
resolution.”138 First, “because the views of professional associations 
often change, tying Eighth Amendment law to these views will lead to 
instability and continue to fuel protracted litigation.”139 Second, the 
post-Hall landscape will become substantially more difficult to navigate 
because the Court is subsequently forced to “follow every new change 
in the thinking of these professional organizations or to judge the 
validity of each new change.”140 Third, in the event that they disagree, 
the Court must now “determine which professional organizations are 
entitled to special deference.”141 Fourth, the aspects of intellectual 
disabilities that are relevant to the capital punishment context are not the 
same as those relevant to non-criminal evaluations.142   
In conclusion, Alito asserted that “[t]here are various ways to 
account for error in IQ testing” and Florida’s practice of allowing 
defendants to submit scores from multiple IQ tests represented one such 
acceptable method.143 Levying one last criticism, Alito faulted the 
majority for “unjustifiably assum[ing] a blanket (or very common) error 
measurement of 5” points on IQ tests.144 By “blindly import[ing] a 5-
point margin of error” the majority failed to recognize that “every test 
has a different SEM.”145 
D. Brumfield v. Cain (2015) 
Shortly after Hall, the Court in Brumfield v. Cain considered 
whether a person on Louisiana’s death row had met the required 
threshold to receive a hearing on his alleged intellectual disabilities.146 
In this case, the Court recognized that Brumfield presented preliminary 
 
138 Id. at 733. 
139 Id. at 731–32. 
140 Id. at 732. 
141 Id. at 733. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 738. Alito opined that Florida did not need to consider the SEM because it 
allowed defendants to submit scores from as many IQ tests as they wished. Id. at 
733–34. The Court had “been presented with no solid evidence that the 
longstanding reliance on multiple IQ test scores as a measure of intellectual 
functioning is so unreasonable or outside the ordinary as to be unconstitutional.” 
Id. at 735. 
144 Id. at 740. 
145 Id. at 740–41. 
146 Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015). 
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evidence of an intellectual disability, including “an IQ score of 75.”147 
However, Louisiana’s trial court denied Brumfield “an evidentiary 
hearing [and refused] granting funds” so he could further establish 
evidence of his intellectual disability.148 Following Louisiana’s 
Supreme Court’s denial to review the trial court’s decision, Brumfield 
submitted a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Louisiana.149 That court observed that 
Brumfield scored 70, 70, 72, and 75 on four separate IQ tests 
administered between 1995 and 2009.150 These scores constituted 
“unadjusted, full scale scores,” meaning that they did not take the SEM 
into account.151 During the highest appeal review, the Supreme Court 
similarly highlighted Brumfield’s scores, stating that “the 
results . . . when adjusted to account for measurement errors, indicated 
that Brumfield had an IQ score between 65 and 70.”152 
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor established that the 
Court “presume[d] that a rule according an evidentiary hearing only to 
those capital defendants who raise a ‘reasonable doubt’ as to their 
intellectual disabilit[ies] is consistent with [the Court’s] decision in 
Atkins.”153 Nevertheless, the Court criticized Louisiana’s trial court for 
interpreting a raw IQ score of 75 as evidence that Brumfield did not 
have an intellectual disability. As the Court noted, “an IQ test result 
cannot be assessed in a vacuum,” and a raw score of 75 “equate[s] to a 
score of 70 or less” when accounting for the SEM.154 Additionally, the 
Court considered “the evidence in the state-court record [to provide] 
substantial grounds to question Brumfield’s adaptive functioning.”155 
Thus, the Court held that the state court erred when it found that 
Brumfield did not meet the minimum threshold showing required to 
grant an evidentiary hearing on his alleged intellectual disability.156 
Furthermore, while “the underlying facts of Brumfield’s crime might 
 
147 Id. at 310. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 311. 
150 Brumfield v. Cain, 854 F. Supp. 2d 366, 389–90 (M.D. La. 2012) rev’d by 
Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918 (5th Cir. 2014). 
151 Id. at 389. 
152 Brumfield, 576 U.S. at 311. 
153 Id. at 313. 
154 Id. at 314. 
155 Id. at 319. 
156 Id. at 320. 
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arguably provide reason to think that Brumfield possessed certain 
adaptive skills,” the Court cited medical standards to demonstrate that 
the proper focus is on adaptive deficits, not strengths.157 Finally, the 
Court stipulated that “[i]t is critical to remember . . . that in seeking an 
evidentiary hearing, Brumfield was not obligated to show that he was 
intellectually disabled, or even that he would likely be able to prove as 
much.”158 Instead, Brumfield was required to satisfy the burden of proof 
necessary to trigger an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Having met this 
burden of proof, the Court held that Brumfield was “entitled to a hearing 
to show that he so lacked the capacity for self-determination that [the 
State, by taking his life,] would violate the Eighth Amendment.”159 
Justice Thomas dissented and painstakingly described the facts 
surrounding the murder Brumfield committed, since “the majority 
devote[d] a single sentence” to the issue.160 He contrasted the 
philanthropy of one of the victim’s sons, who played professional 
football, with Brumfield’s “ceaseless campaign of review 
proceedings.”161 Thomas also contended that the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) precluded federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court, from accepting habeas corpus petitions 




159 Id. at 324. 
160 Id. at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
161 Id. at 332. 
162 Id. at 334. Thomas argued that AEDPA only allowed the Supreme Court to accept 
habeas corpus petitions if a State court unreasonably applied a Federal law, as 
identified in previous Supreme Court decisions, or issued an unreasonable ruling 
given the evidence available to the State court during trial proceedings. Id. 
Because Thomas did not think either criteria applied, he did not consider 
Brumfield to have the proper standing required to bring his habeas corpus petition 
before the Supreme Court. Moreover, Thomas alleged that the Majority opposed 
“the state court’s conclusion that Brumfield had not made a sufficient threshold 
showing of mental retardation to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
claim,” but this conclusion rested on “the application of law to fact, not on the 
determination of the facts themselves.” Id. at 338. In other words, Thomas argued 
that the Majority reversed the state court’s decision because it perceived the state 
court to have misapplied the law. AEDPA, however, only permitted the Court to 
reverse state court decisions if the facts of the case had been improperly decided. 
Id. at 342. As a result, Thomas objected because the Majority took “a meritless 
state-law claim” and presented “it as two factual determinations” in order to 
achieve its desired outcome. Id. According to Thomas, “Atkins . . . did not 
imply—let alone hold—that a prisoner is entitled to a hearing on an Atkins claim.” 
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entirely disregard the Majority’s stipulation that states must add an SEM 
of +5/-5 to raw IQ scores.163 Instead, he found that “the record justified 
a finding that Brumfield’s IQ is 75, if not a bit higher.”164 With this 
statement, Thomas implied that Brumfield, having scored above 70, was 
not intellectually disabled. To support his position, Thomas emphasized 
Brumfield’s adaptive strengths and concluded that “[t]he 
record . . . supports the state court’s finding that Brumfield is not 
impaired in adaptive skills.”165 
E. Moore v. Texas I (2017) 
In Moore v. Texas I, the Supreme Court considered whether states 
could assess intellectual disabilities in a way that ran afoul of current 
medical standards or relied on outdated standards. After the Court 
decided Atkins, the Texas legislature failed to define intellectual 
disabilities or how they should be evaluated in capital cases. Seeking to 
fill that void, the Texas CCA provided a definition in its 2004 Ex parte 
Briseno decision which was based on medical diagnostic criteria 
published in 1992.166 In addition to the medical criteria, the Texas CCA 
also introduced the Briseno factors, derived from character traits 
displayed by the fictional character Lennie from John Steinback’s novel 
Of Mice and Men.167 By the time the Texas CCA delivered its Ex parte 
Moore168 ruling, the medical diagnostic criteria that the Briseno court 
utilized had been updated with revised standards.169 Nevertheless, the 
 
Id. at 344. Finally, Thomas perceived the Court to have “concede[d] that the 
record includes evidence supporting [the state] court’s factual findings.” Id. at 
349. For this reason, Thomas thought “that concession should bar relief for 
Brumfield.” Id. 
163 Id. at 340–41. 
164 Id. at 336 (Brumfield obtained raw IQ scores of 70, 70, 72, and 75 on four separate 
tests. Applying an SEM of +5/-5 to these scores would have produced scores of 
65, 65, 67, and 70, respectively.). 
165 Id. “Brumfield lived independently before his arrest, often staying with his 
pregnant girlfriend and had been able to maintain a job for approximately three 
months before quitting . . . .” Id. at 337. 
166 Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). See also Alexander 
H. Updegrove et al., Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases: Adjusting State 
Statutes After Moore v. Texas, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 
535 (2018). 
167 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
168 Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 
169 See Updegrove et al., supra note 166, at 535. See also supra text accompanying 
note 45. 
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Texas CCA relied upon both the 1992 medical diagnostic criteria and 
the Briseno factors to determine that Moore was not intellectually 
disabled.170 
This set the stage for Justice Ginsburg to write in Moore I that the 
Court’s Hall “instruction[s] cannot sensibly be read to give courts leave 
to diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus.”171 
Additionally, “the several factors Briseno set out as indicators of 
intellectual disability are an invention of the CCA untied to any 
acknowledged source.”172 Because the Briseno factors were neither 
“aligned with the medical community’s information” nor given 
“strength from [the Court’s] precedent[s],” the Court held that “they 
may not be used . . . to restrict qualification of an individual as 
intellectually disabled.”173 The Court summarized testimony on 
Moore’s limited intellectual capacity, writing “[a]t 13, Moore lacked 
basic understanding of the days of the week, the months of the year, and 
the seasons; he could scarcely tell time or comprehend the standards of 
measure or the basic principle that subtraction is the reverse of 
addition.”174 
The Court then identified “the generally accepted, uncontroversial 
intellectual-disability diagnostic definition” located in the most recent 
version of the AAIDD as the appropriate standard for evaluating capital 
defendants for intellectual disabilities.175 The Court observed that the 
Texas CCA relied on the Briseno factors without “citation to any 
authority, medical or judicial . . . .”176 The Court also felt the Texas 
CCA focused on Moore’s adaptive strengths, including “living on the 
streets, playing pool and mowing lawns for money, committing the 
crime in a sophisticated way and then fleeing, testifying and 
representing himself at trial, and developing skills in prison.”177 All of 
these perceived strengths influenced the Texas CCA to disregard “the 
significance of Moore’s adaptive limitations.”178 
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The Moore I Court reaffirmed Hall: “a State cannot refuse to 
entertain other evidence of intellectual disability when a defendant has 
an IQ score above 70.”179 Furthermore, the Court highlighted that in 
Hall their analysis “relied on the most recent (and still current) versions 
of the leading diagnostic manuals—the DSM-5 and AAIDD-11[]”—as 
the authorities on intellectual disabilities.180 Expanding on its position, 
the Court wrote that “Hall indicated that being informed by the medical 
community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest 
medical guide. But neither does our precedent license disregard of 
current medical standards.”181 Because “Moore’s score of 74, adjusted 
for the standard error of measurement, yield[ed] a range of 69 to 79,” 
and “the lower end of Moore’s score range [fell] at or below 70,” the 
Texas CCA erred in concluding that Moore could not be intellectually 
disabled.182 Such a ruling would be “irreconcilable with Hall.”183 Hall 
required state courts to “continue the inquiry and consider other 
evidence of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, 
adjusted for the test’s standard error, falls within the clinically 
established range for intellectual-functioning deficits.”184 
Upon review, the Court found the Texas CCA to have 
“overemphasized Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths” while “the 
medical community [instead] focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry 
on adaptive deficits.”185 Likewise, the CCA erred when it “stressed 
Moore’s improved behavior in prison,” since “[c]linicians . . . caution 
against reliance on adaptive strengths developed ‘in a controlled 
setting,’ as a prison surely is.”186 Moreover, Texas incorrectly suggested 
that childhood trauma precludes a finding of intellectual disabilities 
when in fact “[c]linicians rely on such factors as cause to explore the 
 
179 Id. at 1048. 
180 Id. The Court is referring to the manuals published by the American Psychiatric 
Association, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM–5], and the American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, AM. ASS’N ON 
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: 
DEFINITIONS, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (11th ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter AAIDD–11]. 
181 Moore I, at 1049. 
182 Id. 
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184 Id. at 1050. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. (quoting DSM–5, supra note 180, at 38). 
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prospect of intellectual disability further, not to counter the case for a 
disability determination.”187 Furthermore, the lower court “departed 
from clinical practice by requiring Moore to show that his adaptive 
deficits” did not originate from another cause, such as a different 
psychological disorder, that would not entitle Moore to execution 
relief.188 The Court criticized this tactic because professionals 
acknowledge that “many intellectually disabled people also have other 
mental or physical impairments.”189 Therefore, the presence of an 
additional disorder is not justification for ruling that a person is not 
intellectually disabled.190 
The Court reasoned that there was an increased likelihood that states 
would execute people with intellectual disabilities because “[b]y design 
and in operation, the Briseno factors” “advanced lay perceptions of 
intellectual disability.”191 This was worrisome because “the medical 
profession has endeavored to counter lay stereotypes” of people with 
intellectual disabilities, which the Texas practice contradicted.192 
Therefore, these lay stereotypes, “much more than medical and clinical 
appraisals, should spark skepticism.”193 The Court also highlighted that 
even looking within Texas’ own practices “[t]he Briseno factors [were] 
an outlier[.]”194 “Texas itself [did] not follow Briseno in contexts other 
than the death penalty”.195 Emphasizing this point, the court stressed 
that “Texas cannot satisfactorily explain why it applie[d] current 
medical standards for diagnosing intellectual disabilit[ies] in other 
contexts, yet clings to superseded standards when an individual’s life is 
at stake.”196 While Atkins did afford states freedom to define intellectual 
disabilities, Hall limited the scope of that freedom.197 Notably, the Court 
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established the DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11 as offering an “improved 
understanding” over older versions of those same manuals.198 
Consequently, “[t]he medical community’s current standards supply 
one constraint on States’ leeway in this area.”199 The Court remanded 
the case because Texas “failed adequately to inform” its decision with 
current medical understandings of intellectual disabilities and instead 
insisted on “clinging to the standard it laid out in Briseno, including the 
wholly nonclinical Briseno factors[.]”200 
Chief Justice Roberts conceded in his dissent that the Briseno factors 
were “an unacceptable method” of protecting the intellectually disabled 
from execution in light of Atkins, but he did not find that the Texas CCA 
“erred as to Moore’s intellectual functioning.”201 His primary objection 
was that the majority “abandon[ed] the usual mode of 
analysis . . . employed in Eighth Amendment cases.”202 According to 
Roberts, “clinicians, not judges, should determine clinical standards; 
and judges, not clinicians, should determine the content of the Eighth 
Amendment.”203 He claimed the majority “craft[ed] a constitutional 
holding based solely on what it deem[ed] to be medical consensus about 
intellectual disability,” thereby confusing the roles of clinician and 
judge.204 
Roberts also considered the lower court to be justified in refusing 
“to modify the legal standard it had previously set out[,]” despite the 
medical community updating the diagnostic criteria upon which that 
standard was based on.205 Roberts argued further that Texas’ ruling did 
not contradict Hall. Although calculating Moore’s IQ test score with the 
SEM resulted in a range that “placed [him] within the parameters for 
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning[,]” the true score “was 
unlikely to be in the lower end of the error-generated range because he 
was likely exerting poor effort and experiencing depression at the time 
the test was administered . . . .”206 For Roberts, Moore scored too high 
to meet the first prong for intellectual disability and therefore he “could 
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not be found intellectually disabled” at all.207 Furthermore, Roberts 
rejected the argument that it was problematic to conclude that Moore’s 
adaptive deficits resulted “not from low intellectual abilities, but instead 
from outside factors like the trauma and abuse he suffered as a child and 
his drug use at a young age.”208 
Ultimately, the Chief Justice found that the majority “depart[ed] 
from [the] Court’s precedents, followed in Atkins and Hall.”209 He 
considered determinations of “cruel and unusual” to hinge on “judicial 
judgment about societal standards of decency, not a medical assessment 
of clinical practice.”210 Therefore, the majority erred when it ruled 
“without any consideration of the state practices” it referenced in 
Hall.211 Roberts stated the majority opinion was “based solely on what 
the Court views to be departure from typical clinical practice” instead 
of focusing on state statutes.212 This approach was problematic because 
the purpose of medical diagnostic criteria is not to “describe who is 
morally culpable.”213 The Moore I opinion”[was] not compelled by 
Hall; it [was] an expansion of it.”214 
F. Moore v. Texas II (2019) 
After the Moore I Court remanded the case, the Texas CCA once 
again determined that Moore was not intellectually disabled.215 The 
Court reaffirmed both the DSM-5 and AAIDD-11 definitions of 
intellectual disabilities as “valid” and representing “the three underlying 
legal criteria” that states must use when evaluating capital defendants 
for intellectual disabilities.216 According to the Court, Moore I 
established that Moore “had demonstrated sufficient intellectual-
functioning deficits to require consideration of the second criterion—
adaptive functioning.”217 Similarly, the Court observed that, “[w]ith 
respect to the third criterion, we found general agreement that any onset 
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took place when Moore was a minor.”218 All that remained, therefore, 
was to determine whether Moore displayed adaptive deficits. An answer 
in the affirmative would satisfy the diagnostic criteria for intellectual 
disability and qualify him for execution relief. 
In summary of the Moore I ruling, the Court had “identified at least 
five errors” committed by the Texas CCA.219 First, the court cited 
Moore’s alleged adaptive strengths to justify disregarding his adaptive 
deficits.220 Second, the court cited Moore’s functioning in prison as 
evidence of adaptive strengths.221 Next, the Texas court found that 
Moore could not have an intellectual disability because his adaptive 
deficits were caused by childhood trauma.222 Fourth, the CCA attributed 
Moore’s adaptive deficits to a personality disorder instead of intellectual 
disability.223 Fifth, and finally, the court relied on the Briseno factors to 
conclude that Moore was not intellectually disabled.224 This analysis 
was problematic in light of the current medical consensus. 225 
In Moore II, the Court reviewed the Texas CCA’s ruling and found 
that it could not be reconciled with Moore I because there were “too 
many instances in which, with small variations, it repeat[ed] the analysis 
[the Court had] previously found wanting, and [those] same parts [were] 
critical to its ultimate conclusion.”226 For example, the Texas CCA 









225 Id. Current medical consensus required examining adaptive deficits, not strengths. 
Id. at 668–69. Clinicians also cautioned against drawing conclusions about a 
person’s adaptive deficits based on how they functioned in highly structured 
environments that poorly approximated life in the community at large. Id. at 669. 
Furthermore, it is recognized that trauma increases, not decreases, the likelihood 
of intellectual disabilities. Current medical practice did not consider the existence 
of one psychological disorder to preclude a second diagnosis of intellectual 
disabilities since comorbidity is common. Id. Finally, and importantly, the 
medical community discredited the Briseno factors, which “had no grounding in 
prevailing medical practice” and encouraged basing intellectual disabilities 
diagnoses on popular misconceptions. Id. 
226 Id. at 670. 
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apparent adaptive strengths.”227 Additionally, the lower court “relied 
heavily upon adaptive improvements made [by Moore] in prison.”228 
The Court found that “[t]he length and detail of the [CCA’s] discussion 
on these points [was] difficult to square with our caution against relying 
on prison-based development[s].”229 Furthermore, and in direct contrast 
to Moore I, the Texas CCA found Moore intellectually able because he 
failed to demonstrate that his adaptive deficits were directly attributable 
to intellectual disabilities rather than another psychological disorder.230 
Finally, the Court observed that although the Texas CCA’s “opinion 
[was] not identical to the opinion [the Court] considered in Moore [I],” 
it still contained “sentences here and there suggesting reliance upon” 
common misconceptions about intellectual disabilities.231 As a result, 
the Court held that the CCA’s ruling 
when taken as a whole and when read in the light both of our prior 
opinion and the trial court record, rests upon analysis too much of 
which too closely resembles what we previously found improper. 
And extricating that analysis from the opinion leaves too little that 




The Court concluded that “Moore has shown he is a person with 
intellectual disabilit[ies],” effectively exempting him from execution.233 
In dissent, Justice Alito argued that the ruling of the Texas CCA 
complied with the court’s precedent because it “adopted the leading 
contemporary clinical standards for assessing intellectual disabilit[ies],” 
 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 671. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 672. The Court arrived at this conclusion based on “the similarity of 
language and content between Briseno’s factors and the [CCA’s] statements . . . .” 
Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. Chief Justice Roberts concurred, acknowledging that, although he could 
foresee “difficulties . . . applying Moore [I] in other cases, it [was] easy to see that 
the Texas [CCA] misapplied it here.” Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Once again, 
the state court “repeated the same errors that [the] Court previously condemned,” 
including “improper reliance on the [Briseno] factors” and focusing on “Moore’s 
adaptive strengths rather than his deficits.” Id. Roberts noted that the prior 
approach “did not pass muster under [the] Court’s analysis last time,” and “still 
doesn’t.” Id. 
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as required by Moore I.234 Alito accused the majority of engaging in 
“factfinding” rather than addressing “a legal error . . . .”235 For the 
dissenting Justice, this approach constituted “an unsound departure 
from our usual practice,” and stemmed from the Court’s “own failure to 
provide a coherent rule of decision in Moore [I].”236 
III. STATE COURT CASES CITING EITHER MOORE I OR MOORE II 
Following Colorado’s repeal of the death penalty in March 2020,237 
the total number of states that retain the death penalty fell to twenty-
eight.238 Of these twenty-eight states, nine do not have any cases citing 
Moore I or Moore II.239 The remaining nineteen states cite to Moore I 
or Moore II in forty-five cases, collectively.240 This Section details state 
court applications and interpretations of Moore I and Moore II and gives 
special attention to the usages which appear suspect given the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s direction. 
A. Current Medical Standards 
Courts from thirteen different states cite Moore I or Moore II to 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court of the United States requires states 
to use current medical diagnostic criteria when evaluating capital 
defendants for intellectual disabilities.241 
 
234 Id. at 673 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
235 Id. at 674. 
236 Id. 
237 See Neil Vigdor, Colorado Abolishes Death Penalty and Commutes Sentences of 
Death Row Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/colorado-death-penalty-repeal.html 
[https://perma.cc/4G4P-LJMS]. 
238 See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 8. 
239 See infra Appendix Table I. As of the date of this Article these nine states are: 
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, 
and Wyoming. 
240 See infra Appendix Table 1, which shows that as of the date of this Article 
Alabama courts cited Moore I or Moore II in five cases; Arkansas in one; Arizona 
in one; California in two; Florida in four; Georgia in one; Nevada in two; North 
Carolina in one; Ohio in three; Oregon in one; Pennsylvania in three; South 
Carolina in one; Tennessee in one; and Texas in seventeen (excluding Ex parte 
Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), which the United States 
Supreme Court overturned in Moore II). 
241 See infra Appendix Table 2. 
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For example, in Callen v. State, the Alabama Criminal Court of 
Appeals (“CCA”) recognized that Moore I criticized the Texas CCA for 
having “erroneously applied decades-old standards and fail[ing] to 
consider” current medical diagnostic criteria.242 Similarly, in Carroll v. 
State, the state court found Moore I to be a direct response to the Texas 
CCA, which “ignored prevailing medical standards and applied its own 
definition of [intellectual disability] to determine that a death-row 
inmate was not exempt from the death penalty under Atkins.”243 The 
Alabama court also interpreted Moore I as precluding the use of 
definitions of intellectual disabilities “that substantially deviate from 
prevailing clinical standards.”244 In Ex parte Carroll the Alabama 
Supreme Court stated that Moore I addressed “whether states may 
define intellectual disability in a manner that is (1) uninformed by the 
medical community or (2) based on outdated medical standards.”245 For 
its part, that court understood Moore I to “clearly [require] states to 
assess intellectual disabilit[ies] using the most current medical 
standards[.]”246 
When deciding Ex parte Lane, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
referred to Moore I to establish that current medical standards associate 
childhood trauma with an increased likelihood of intellectual 
disabilities.247 Although the trial court ruled that Lane was not 
intellectually disabled, Moore I convinced the prosecution that the trial 
court had erred in reaching that conclusion.248 Consequently, “the State 
filed a brief acknowledging that the trial court had failed to make 
findings regarding the relevant adaptive-skill areas and conceding that 
the trial court” did not use the appropriate diagnostic criteria for 
intellectual disabilities.249 The court was struck by the unusual 
circumstances, observing that, “the State has indicated that it concedes 
that the evidence established that Lane is intellectually disabled and that 
the trial court simply substituted its own standards for intellectual 
 
242 Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177, 197 n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017). 
243 Carroll v. State (Carroll I), 300 So. 3d 51, 54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017). 
244 Id. at 55. 
245 Carroll v. State (Carroll II), 300 So. 3d 59, 63 (Ala. 2019). 
246 Id. at 63–64. 
247 Ex parte Lane, 286 So. 3d 61, 66 (Ala. 2018). 
248 Id. at 68–69. 
249 Id. at 68. “[T]he State went further in its concessions, joining Lane in requesting 
that [Alabama’s Supreme Court] remand the matter so that the trial court [could] 
sentence Lane to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 69. 
2021 Modern Application of Moore v. Texas 33 
disabilit[ies] for those accepted by the medical community.”250 Given 
the agreement that the wrong standard was used, the court remanded the 
case with instructions to commute Lane’s sentence to LWOP.251 
The Florida Supreme Court in Glover v. State, found that Moore I 
admonished the Texas CCA because it “relied upon superseded medical 
standards to conclude that the defendant was not intellectually 
disabled.”252 The Florida court argued in a subsequent case that “Moore 
[I] does not substantially change the law with regard to consideration of 
intelligence or IQ for the purposes of an [intellectual disability] 
determination.”253 Instead, Moore I prohibited states from relying on 
outdated medical diagnostic criteria.254 As a result, the Florida court 
considered itself blameless, because neither the state statutory scheme 
“nor this Court’s interpretation of the statute [had] been superseded by 
medical standards.”255 The court observed that Moore I explained how 
Texas “also erred by concluding that the defendant’s academic failures 
and childhood abuse detracted from an adaptive deficit 
finding . . . [when] medical experts would consider those ‘risk factors’ 
for [intellectual disability] rather than a basis to counter an [intellectual 
disability] determination.”256 
In State v. Thurber, the Supreme Court of Kansas summarized 
Moore I to mean that: “states cannot restrict an individual’s qualification 
as intellectually disabled by using outdated medical standards; these 




252 Glover v. State, 226 So. 3d 795, 811 n.13 (Fla. 2017). See also Wright v. State, 
256 So. 3d 766, 770 (Fla. 2018) (When deciding In re Lewis, the California 
Supreme Court understood Moore I to stipulate that “the determination [of 
intellectual disability] must be an individualized one, informed by the views of 
medical experts.”). 
253 Wright v. State, 256 So. 3d 766, 770 (Fla. 2018). 
254 Id. at 774. 
255 Id. at 775. 
256 Id. (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017)). Justice Pariente concurred 
with the result, but felt it bore mentioning that “the two medical diagnostic 
standards relied on in Moore [I] [were] the DSM and the AAIDD, current 
editions.” Id. at 780 n.13 (Pariente, J., concurring). Interestingly, and to Justice 
Pariente’s point, Georgia’s Court of Appeals has interpreted Moore I as requiring 
adherence to a definition of intellectual disabilities that, for all intents and 
purposes, appeared consistent with the definition listed in the DSM–5 and 
AAIDD–11, although the court neglected to reference either manual by name. 
Cawthon v. State, 830 S.E.2d 270, 275 n.18 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). 
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consensus reflecting its improved understanding over time.”257 Simply 
put, Moore I rejected the use of “outdated” and “archaic” diagnostic 
criteria.”258 The Kansas court found “significance in [Moore I’s] 
holding that current medical standards would further restrict a state’s 
discretion in defining intellectual disabilit[ies] for purposes of enforcing 
the Eighth Amendment categorical prohibition on executing the 
intellectually disabled.”259 In light of the endorsement of current 
medical criteria, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the state statute 
governing the evaluation of intellectual disabilities among capital 
defendants.260 Specifically, “since the medical community does not treat 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to conform 
one’s conduct to the requirements of law as conclusively demonstrating 
the absence of an intellectual disability, Kansas cannot statutorily 
require courts to disregard other relevant medical standards.”261 
Satisfied with its interpretation of the statute’s requirements, the 
court went on to elaborate how Moore I “recognize[d] in the death 
penalty context that states are constrained at least to some extent by the 
clinical definition of intellectual disabilit[ies] used in the medical 
community, i.e., states must be informed by—and cannot disregard—
current medical community standards on this subject.”262 Because 
current medical standards identified three separate criteria that patients 
 
257 State v. Thurber, 420 P.3d 389, 402 (Kan. 2018). 
258 Id. at 447. 
259 Id. 
260 The statute defined intellectual disabilities in capital cases as “having significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning . . . to an extent which substantially 
impairs one’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to 
conform one’s conduct to the requirements of law.” KAN. STAT. ANN., § 21-
6622(h) (2016). The statute was “further suspect . . . because it applie[d] to death 
penalty defendants, but not to noncriminal individuals when making intellectual 
disability determinations for noncriminal purposes.” Thurber, 420 P.3d at 450. 
The court could not “discern how this incapacity limitation safeguards Kansans’ 
Eighth Amendment rights, and the State provide[d] no justification for applying 
a different standard in the death penalty context.” Id. Consequently, and consistent 
with this reasoning, the court removed the problematic condition from the statute 
by deleting the phrase “to an extent which substantially impairs one’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to conform one’s conduct to the 
requirements of law.” Id. at 451. The statute now defines intellectual disabilities 
within the capital context as “having significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning, as defined by K.S.A. 76-12b01, and amendments thereto.” Id. 
261 Thurber, 420 P.3d at 450. 
262 Id. at 452. 
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must meet, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the state must evaluate 
intellectual disabilities in accordance with those three prongs.263 
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Woodall v. Commonwealth, 
considered Moore I to contain “better, but not much clearer, guidance 
as to how courts should evaluate” capital defendants for intellectual 
disabilities.264 Despite finding the Moore I court to have “not provided 
crystal-clear guidance,” the Kentucky court nevertheless judged as 
“clear” the fact that “prevailing medical standards should be the basis 
for a determination as to a defendant’s intellectual disability to preclude 
the imposition of the death penalty.”265 In Carr v. State, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court held a similar view, pronouncing that “Moore I 
reiterated Atkins and did not alter the Atkins landscape,” although, the 
court did note that Moore I required some deference to medical 
standards.266 
In Johnson v. State, the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed a case 
where “uncontested evidence showed [that Johnson’s] IQ was between 
53 and 63, which uncontestably put him in the category of those 
considered intellectually disabled by clinicians.”267 Unfortunately, the 
defendant’s attorney never informed him that he satisfied the criteria for 
intellectual disabilities and could be ineligible for execution.268 
Deprived of this “critical additional information,” Johnson entered a 
guilty plea to ensure that he would not receive a sentence of death.269 
On appeal, Johnson argued a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
which the Missouri Supreme Court disagreed with.270 Additionally: 
[b]ecause the trier of fact never adjudicated Johnson to be 
intellectually disabled . . . . not only was Johnson’s counsel correct 
to advise him he could receive the death penalty if he took his case 
to trial, but Johnson’s counsel also had a duty to so inform him 






264 Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2018). 
265 Id. at 4–5. 
266 Carr v. State, 2017-CA-01481-SCT, ⁋ 16 (Miss. 2019). 
267 Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) (Stith, J., dissenting). 
268 Id. at 924 (provided that the jury believed the evidence and found Johnson 
intellectually disabled). 
269 Id. at 908. 
270 Id. at 905 (majority opinion). 
271 Id. at 903. 
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The Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that “no amount of additional 
investigation [from Johnson’s counsel] would have changed the fact that 
Johnson had not yet been adjudicated as intellectually disabled.”272 This 
led the court to conclude that “[i]f Johnson’s ultimate reason for 
pleading guilty was to avoid receiving the death penalty, as he testified 
it was, then any additional investigation and advice from counsel 
regarding his eligibility for the death penalty would not have affected 
his decision to accept the State’s offer and plead guilty.”273 Accordingly, 
“[a]ccepting the State’s plea offer . . . was the only way for Johnson to 
definitively ensure he would not receive the death penalty.”274   
Confusingly, the Missouri Supreme Court simultaneously conceded 
that “Johnson introduced evidence establishing he had an IQ of 63” and 
held that “it was not clear error to find Johnson was competent to enter 
a guilty plea.”275 This decision is hard to square with Atkins, which 
exempted everyone with intellectual disabilities from execution 
precisely because their “impairments can jeopardize the reliability and 
fairness of capital proceedings against” them.276 The majority charged 
the criticism in the dissent as being “misplaced” for relying on Moore I 
and Moore II, because “there has never been a finding at any stage in 
this case as to whether Johnson is—or is not—intellectually 
disabled.”277 Accordingly, while the court agreed that Moore I and 
Moore II represented the most recent precedent on intellectual 
disabilities in capital cases, it declined to hold that those cases had any 
bearing on whether Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel 
or was competent to enter a guilty plea.278 
Unlike the majority, the dissent deemed Moore I and Moore II as 
compelling the states to define intellectual disabilities in a manner 
consistent with the DSM–5 and AAIDD–11.279 Moreover, Justice Stith 
 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 903. 
274 Id. at 904. 
275 Id. 
276 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002). For an in-depth discussion of 
Atkins, see supra Part II. 
277 See Johnson v. State, 580 S.W. 3d 895, 913 (Mo. 2019) (Stith, J., dissenting). The 
Missouri Supreme Court alleged that the dissent improperly “divert[ed] attention 
from the issues actually presented by this case.” Id. at 906 n.9. 
278 Id. at 907–08. 
279 Id. at 916. The dissent interpreted the Moore cases to mean: 
Atkins, as clarified by Hall, Moore I, and Moore II, set out clearly 
how states are limited by clinical guidance in determining 
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found the Moore cases to specifically require clinicians to assess capital 
defendants for adaptive deficits.280 Honing in on the asserted ineffective 
assistance of counsel theory, the dissent highlighted that: 
[d]espite having no familiarity with the definition of intellectual 
disability, and despite testifying that he has no relevant medical or 
clinical experience, [Johnson’s counsel] testified he did not believe 
Mr. Johnson was intellectually disabled. Counsel’s first grave error, 
therefore, was totally failing to familiarize himself with the legal 
standard of who is eligible to be executed before giving Mr. Johnson 




intellectual disabilit[ies]. To determine whether there is evidence of 
low intellectual functioning, clinicians give multiple IQ scores and 
account for a standard error of measurement (five points) when an 
IQ score is close to, but above 70. Then, to determine whether this 
low IQ is accompanied by adaptive behavior deficits, clinicians, 
preferably using standardized instruments, should examine records 
from childhood and interview those who knew the defendant, 
looking only at whether the defendant, when in a non-penal 
environment, exhibited deficits in conceptual, social, or practice 
skills. Finally, some evidence of the deficits should be available 
before age 18. 
 Id. (citations omitted). 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 920. The dissenting Justice highlighted the following exchange between the 
court and Johnson’s counsel: 
Q.  Are you familiar with Atkins vs. Virginia? 
A.  Vaguely. 
Q.  Do you know the whole Atkins vs. Virginia? 
A.  Not offhand. 
Q.  Are you familiar with Hall vs. Florida? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Is someone who suffers from mental retardation eligible for the death 
penalty? 
A.  I do not believe so. 
Q.  Did you discuss this with Mr. Johnson? 
A.  I did not believe that Mr. Johnson was found to be mentally—have 
mental retardation. Close to it, but not mental retardation. 
Q.  What is the definition of mental retardation? 
A.  I’m not a doctor. I don’t know. I just know that in my—my relationship 
with Mr. Johnson and in speaking with him, that I did not believe that he 
suffered from mental retardation. 
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In conjunction with other evidence, this neglect supported a conclusion 
that “[c]ounsel’s deficient performance stemmed from his 
incompetence in failing to familiarize himself with relevant law 
surrounding the eligibility for the death penalty and his inability to 
recognize the difference between competency and intellectual 
disability.”282 When reviewing the full extent of the attorney’s 
shortcomings, Justice Stith felt that Johnson had satisfactorily “shown 
[that] his defense counsel’s performance was far outside the degree of 
skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney given 
counsel’s complete failure to inform Mr. Johnson of a possible defense 
to the death penalty.”283 
In State v. Vela, the defendant made a similar argument before the 
Nebraska Supreme Court, stating “that his counsel’s performance was 
deficient because counsel failed to adequately present” evidence of his 
intellectual disabilities.284 The trial court applied an SEM of +5/-5 to 
Vela’s raw IQ test score of 75, as required by Hall, and ruled that he 
met the first prong for finding intellectual disability.285 Having satisfied 
the first criteria, the trial court proceeded to focus on whether Vela 
possessed any adaptive deficits, also keeping in line with Hall. As part 
of this adaptive functioning evaluation, the state-appointed expert 
requested access to Vela, which Vela’s counsel denied.286 Unable to 
visit Vela, the state expert conducted his assessment based on other 
available information, and ultimately testified that Vela was not 
intellectually disabled.287 Informed by “testing done by several experts, 
 
Q.  Are you familiar with the standards that have been used by the U.S. 
Courts? 
A.  I don’t know what—I don’t understand the question. 
Q.  What standard of the definition of mental retardation was used? 
A.  I don’t know. If you provide me with it, I could tell you. 
Q.  Did you know at the time? 
A.  I did not believe he was mentally retarded. 
Q.  But you did not know what the definition was? 
A.  It was—just never even occurred to me to look. 
 Id. at 919–20. 
282 Id. at 928. 
283 Id. 
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including those retained at Vela’s request and those retained at the 
State’s request,” the trial court found that Vela failed to provide 
evidence of adaptive deficits.288 
The Nebraska Supreme Court saw no issue with Vela’s counsel in 
2010, since the state-appointed expert “was able to use alternative 
means to evaluate Vela’s adaptive behavior.”289 Testimony from the 
state expert in 2010 revealed that, “while Vela had limitations in certain 
adaptive skill areas, his overall adaptive behavior was appropriate for 
his age.”290 Without access to Vela, however, the state expert had to 
formulate his opinion based on “two third-party informants who were 
acquainted with Vela for 2 to 3 months prior to his arrest.”291 The 
defense-appointed expert also assessed Vela for adaptive deficits using 
“Vela’s older sister” as the third-party source of information.292 The 
expert for the defense concluded that “Vela had significant impairment 
in the adaptive behavior areas of communication, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, self-direction, and functional academic 
skills.”293 When justifying the decision to afford greater weight to the 
state’s expert, the Nebraska Supreme Court explained that, “[t]he State 
presented evidence of Vela’s ability to adapt to procedures and 
conditions within the prison system,” which suggests that the court 
interpreted this testimony as additional evidence that Vela had no 
adaptive deficits.294 Both Vela’s father and sister provided the trial court 
with extensive evidence that he was intellectually disabled.295 
Nonetheless, the Madison County District Court “found that the 
evidence did not establish at least two significant limitations in adaptive 
behavior,” and therefore “Vela was not a person with mental 
retardation.”296 
In its 2010 opinion, the Nebraska Supreme Court observed that the 
state expert “met with Vela and Vela’s attorneys on two occasions[,]” 
both of which ended in Vela’s counsel denying the expert’s “request to 
 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 21. 
290 State v. Vela, 777 N.W.2d 266, 299 (Neb. 2010). 
291 Id. 
292 Id. at 295. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 299. 
295 See infra pp. 42–43 and note 312. 
296 Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 299. 
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administer a test designed to measure adaptive behavior.”297 When 
reviewing the case again in 2017, the same court considered the lack of 
access to Vela irrelevant since “even if Vela’s allegation that his counsel 
prevented [the expert] from performing adaptive testing on Vela is true, 
such action by counsel did not prejudice Vela, because [the expert] was 
able to use alternative means to evaluate Vela’s adaptive 
behavior[.]”298Despite recognizing that Moore I criticized the Texas 
CCA for relying “on superseded medical standards” this court reasoned 
that: 
Vela challenged the effectiveness of counsel based on his allegation 
that counsel completely prevented an evaluation of his adaptive 
functioning. Vela did not challenge the appropriateness of specific 
standards or methods that were used to evaluate his adaptive 
functioning, and therefore, consideration of that question is not 
before us in this appeal.
299
 
 The decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court is notable for 
several reasons. First, the court ruled that Vela’s counsel’s denial of 
state expert testing “did not prejudice Vela[.]”300 Yet denial restricted 
the expert’s evaluation of his adaptive functioning to information 
gleaned from “third-party informants “301 Contrary to the court’s claim, 
Moore I is undeniably relevant here because on review, a court cannot 
“diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus” when 
evaluating capital defendants for intellectual disabilities.302 The 
consensus amongst clinicians reveals that, “[t]he most common 
approach to assessment of adaptive skills [in the capital context] has 
been the administration of a standardized adaptive behavior scale with 
information provided by a person who knows the individual well.”303 
 
297 Id. at 297. 
298 See Vela, 900 N.W.2d at 21. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 20 (quoting Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 299). 
302 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017). 
303 Caroline Everington & J. Gregory Olley, Implications of Atkins v. Virginia: 
Issues in Defining and Diagnosing Mental Retardation, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 
PRAC. 1, 8 (2008). 
The most fundamental difference between IQ tests and adaptive 
behavior scales is that IQ instruments are administered directly to 
the person whose intellectual functioning is being evaluated. By 
contrast, adaptive behavior scales most frequently involve obtaining 
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While both the state and defense experts completed a standardized 
instrument based on third-party testimony, “[t]he choice of informants 
is critical for accurate assessment. [Specifically, t]he informant must 
have had the opportunity to observe the defendant perform a variety of 
tasks in community settings over a period of time.”304 For this reason, 
informants are often “family members, teachers, employers, neighbors, 
and friends.”305 Current medical standards, therefore, would appear to 
require affording greater weight to the defense expert’s testimony 
compared to that of the state expert. 
The medical community recognizes that not all third parties are 
equally qualified to serve as informants, and the identity of the 
informant directly influences the accuracy of the assessment. When 
determining which expert’s testimony is more credible, the relationship 
between the individual interviewed and the individual being evaluated 
matters greatly. In Vela, the exact nature of the relationship between 
Vela and the informants used by the state expert is unclear, but the 
phrase “acquainted with Vela for 2 to 3 months” does not suggest a 
close, personal relationship.306 This is concerning because the 
informants might not have known Vela well enough for the state expert 
to gather an accurate understanding of Vela’s adaptive deficits. For 
example, the defense expert interviewed Vela’s older sister, who knew 
Vela since birth and constituted an unmistakably appropriate informant. 
Moreover, current medical standards recognize that “[i]nformation from 
adaptive skill assessments should be supplemented with additional 
direct measures of client functioning.”307 By refusing to allow the state 
expert access to Vela, his counsel, albeit unknowingly, forced the expert 
 
information from other individuals who know or have known the 
person and who have observed his functioning in everyday life. 
 James W. Ellis, Caroline Everington & Ann M. Delpha, Evaluating Intellectual 
 Disability: Clinical Assessment in Atkins Cases, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1376 
(2018); Gilbert S. Macvaugh II & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia: 
Implications and Recommendations for Forensic Practice, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 131, 168 (2009) (“[I]nformation regarding adaptive function is most reliably 
obtained through the descriptions of third parties who have had the opportunity to 
closely observe the examinee in the community. The individual under evaluation 
is not the most reliable source of information regarding his own adaptive 
functioning.”). 
304 Everington & Olley, supra note 303, at 13. 
305 Id. 
306 Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 299. 
307 Everington & Olley, supra note 303, at 13. 
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to rely on “alternative means” which the Nebraska Supreme Court 
deemed adequate to determine Vela’s adaptive deficits, but nevertheless 
likely violated the standard set out in Moore I.308 
Second, the decision in Vela is notable because when “[t]he State 
presented evidence of Vela’s ability to adapt to procedures and 
conditions within the prison system” the court took that as evidence that 
he did not possess adaptive deficits.309 In Moore I, however, the 
Supreme Court admonished the court for using evidence of adaptive 
deficits displayed in prison as evidence against intellectual 
disabilities.310 Interestingly, in the face of such precedent, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court neglected to mention that Moore I forbid both 
prioritizing defendants’ functioning while in prison and citing adaptive 
strengths to justify disregarding adaptive deficits. 
Finally, there are portions of testimony delivered by Vela’s father 
and sister which shared striking similarities to evidence that the Moore 
I Court found compelling in conducting an adaptive deficit 
determination, including the defendants’ inability to tell time.311 The 
Nebraska Supreme Court reproduced the following account of the 
testimony from Vela’s father and sister: 
Vela needed assistance bathing until he was approximately 10 years 
old. He needed help dressing until after age 12, and was older than 
12 before he could tie his own shoes. He learned to ride a bike at age 
10, and he never learned to tell time. Vela never learned to drive a 
car, never had a checking or savings account, and never learned to 
budget money. As a teenager, he could not buy his own clothes or 




Given that the Moore I Court highlighted the “significant mental and 
social difficulties”313 described by the trial court record, which the 
Moore II Court subsequently relied upon to affirm the adaptive deficit 
 
308 State v. Vela, 900 N.W.2d 8, 21 (Neb. 2017). 
309 Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 299. 
310 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017). 
311 Compare Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 298 (“he never learned to tell time”), with Moore 
I, 137 S. Ct. at 1045 (“he could scarcely tell time”). 
312 Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 298. See supra text accompanying note 174 to compare the 
summary of Moore’s adaptive deficits. 
313 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1045. 
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determination,314 the Nebraska Supreme Court appears to have erred by 
ruling that Vela did not possess the requisite adaptive deficits.315 
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. 
Cox, Moore I signified that “the Briseno factors impermissibly 
substitute a political consensus on who should be exempt from the death 
penalty for objective medical standards.”316 The court also interpreted 
Moore I to require adherence to current medical standards, and noted 
that Moore I “disapproved of the Texas court’s conclusion that Moore’s 
traumatic childhood contraindicated a finding of [intellectual] disability 
when . . . clinicians identify traumatic experiences as a risk factor for 
intellectual disability.”317 While conducting its review on appeal, the 
court emphasized the unusual development that had taken place in the 
case before it. 
[T]he Commonwealth states it has changed its position on 
Appellant’s Atkins claim in light of recent United States Supreme 
Court precedent. The Commonwealth notes that the [Post-
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)] court’s written opinion borrows 
significantly from its post-hearing legal memorandum, including the 
Commonwealth’s urging of consideration of the Briseno factors, 
notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court decision in Moore 
[I] several months earlier.
318
 
Additionally, the Commonwealth “highlight[ed] the similarities 
between the facts and expert opinion evidence in this case with facts and 
expert opinion evidence in Moore [I].”319 It “concede[d] that the PCRA 
 
314 Moore II, 139 S. Ct. at 672. 
315 Other jurisdictions would agree. In an unpublished disposition, Nevada’s 
Supreme Court considered whether “Hall invalidates this court’s prior decision 
that [capital defendant] had not met the requirements for [exclusion from 
execution] because his intellectual disabilities presented after the developmental 
period (birth to 18 years of age).”Mulder v. State, 422 P.3d 1231, at *4 (Nev. July 
26, 2018) (unpublished table decision). The court responded in the negative, 
relying on the Moore I Court’s endorsement of a three-prong definition of 
intellectual disabilities, of which the age of onset requirement was the third prong 
and “a core element” of the diagnostic criteria. Id. 
316 Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 378 (Pa. 2019) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1051). 
317 Id. (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1051). 
318 Id. at 386. An “Atkins claim” involves a capital defendant alleging that they have 
intellectual disabilities and are therefore ineligible for execution. 
319 Id. at 386–87. “[T]he adaptive strengths focused on by the PCRA court are 
comparable to those focused on by the court in Moore . . . .” Id. at 387. 
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court’s reliance on the Briseno factors compels reversal.”320 Due to the 
ruling in Moore I, the Commonwealth changed its position and “now 
contends Appellant met his burden in this case, and urges [the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court] to grant Atkins relief.”321 
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeared sympathetic 
toward the prosecution’s request, it nevertheless explained “that 
confessions of error by the Commonwealth are not binding on a 
reviewing court but may be considered for their persuasive value.”322 
The court then identified that “the chief import of [Moore I was] the 
central role of the societal consensus to rely on medical and professional 
expertise in defining and diagnosing intellectual disabilit[ies].”323 
Moore I, the court said, criticized Texas because its “law and 
practices . . . deviated from that central principle by engrafting arbitrary 
or extraneous considerations into the analysis.”324 Further, in Moore I, 
the Court “particularly disapproved [sic] reliance on the Briseno factors 
as an attempt to impose a consensus of the citizenry about who should 
be eligible for the death sentence rather than criteria accepted in the 
professional and medical community.”325Ultimately, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth’s position, holding that 
the PCRA court improperly “relied on the Briseno factors.”326 Although 
the court found that “the PCRA court made [its] findings and 
determinations, in part, on improper considerations,” the case was 
remanded because the court could not “conclude what credibility and 
factual determinations the PCRA court would have found, applying a 
correct Atkins analysis.”327 
In State v. Blackwell, the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld 
the trial court’s ruling that Blackwell was not intellectually disabled 
“[b]ecause the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony[.]”328 The court 
reached this conclusion despite admitting that “it is concerning that 
Blackwell, at 54 years old, scored 63 and 68 on the I.Q. tests given in 
 
320 Id. at 387. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 146–49 (Pa. 2018)). 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 388. 
325 Id. (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1053). 
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 388–89. 
328 State v. Blackwell, 801 S.E.2d 713, 720 (S.C. 2017). 
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preparation of the Atkins hearing.”329 The trial court denied that 
Blackwell possessed adaptive deficits even while “acknowledg[ing] 
evidence that Blackwell had difficulty living independently after the 
dissolution of his marriage[.]”330 Although unsettling, the trial court did 
not “find this [difficulty adapting] translated into deficits in Blackwell’s 
adaptive behavior.”331 Instead, the lower court underscored Blackwell’s 
adaptive strengths and offered alternate explanations for why he 
struggled, including depression.332 On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina determined that “Blackwell ha[d] not shown the trial 
court committed an error of law or that its decision [was] unsupported 
by the evidence[.]”333 In a footnote, the court explained that it did not 
consider the trial court to have erred, even though the decision preceded 
Moore I, because “the court’s analysis comports with [Moore I].”334 The 
court asserted that Moore I prohibited reliance on outdated medical 
standards and the Briseno factors, which were created without reference 
to any authority.335 Accordingly, Moore I did not compel a reversal of 
the decision before the Supreme Court of South Carolina because the 
trial court’s ruling did not rest on either of those two prohibitions. 
Battaglia v. State asked the Texas CCA to consider whether the trial 
court properly determined that Battaglia was competent for 
execution.336 Traditionally, competency for execution has been treated 
as a separate legal matter from intellectual disabilities.337 Accordingly, 
 




333 Id. at 721–22. 
334 Id. at 721 n.11. 
335 Id. 
336 Battaglia v. State, 537 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). 
337 The issue of competency for execution focuses on how a capital defendant is 
functioning in “the present moment” when “execution is imminent.” Ellis, 
Everington & Delpha, supra note 303, at 1388 & n.322. Given the often long wait 
times on death row from conviction to execution, many capital defendants 
develop symptoms while on death row that raise questions of their competency 
for execution. Id. at 1334 n.127. 
By contrast, intellectual disability is a condition manifested either at 
birth or during childhood (most frequently early in childhood), and 
which essentially remains throughout the individual’s life. As a 
result, the mental illness concerns about substantial changes or 
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the Texas CCA did not cite Moore I in the majority opinion. The dissent, 
however, asserted that Moore I established the need for states to rely on 
current medical standards when conducting evaluations of any kind 
within the capital context.338 As a result, the dissent advocated “to the 
extent that a competency determination requires an assessment of 
whether a defendant is suffering from a severe mental illness, it is 
appropriate to consider the current medical framework in making such 
a determination.”339 
In 2018, the Texas CCA issued an unpublished opinion, Ex parte 
Cathey, observing that Moore I “rejected the use of the Briseno factors 
to analyze adaptive deficits[.]”340 Given that Moore I expounded upon 
previous precedents in this manner, the Texas CCA “exercise[d] [their] 
authority to reconsider this case on [their] own initiative.”341 
Subsequently, the court wrote: 
This cause is remanded to the habeas court to consider all of the 
evidence in light of the Moore v. Texas [I] opinion and make a new 
recommendation to this Court on the issue of intellectual 
disabilit[ies]. If the habeas court deems it necessary, then it may 
receive evidence from mental health experts and any witnesses 
whose evidence the court determines is germane to the question of 
intellectual disabilit[ies]. The habeas court shall then make findings 




Several other unpublished opinions from the Texas CCA echo this 
ruling almost word for word.343 Additional unpublished cases decided 
 
fluctuations in mental state over time do not have a direct analogue 
regarding intellectual disability. 
 Id. at 1389 (footnote omitted). Additionally, issues of intellectual disability are 
usually raised at trial, while issues of competency for execution are typically 
raised on appeal once an execution date has been announced. Id. at 1388 n.322. 
338 Battaglia, 537 S.W.3d at 103 (Alcala, J., dissenting). 
339 Id. 
340 Ex parte Cathey, WR-55,161-02, 2018 WL 5817199, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 
7, 2018) (per curiam). 
341 Id. 
342 Id. at *2. 
343 See Ex parte Henderson, WR-37,658-03, 2018 WL 4762755 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Oct. 3, 2018) (per curiam); Ex parte Lizcano, NO. WR-68,348-03, 2018 WL 
2717035 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 6, 2018) (per curiam); Ex parte Davis, NO. WR-
40,339-09, 2017 WL 6031852 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2017) (per curiam) 
(Newell, J., not participating). 
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by the Texas CCA contain similar phrasing but the CCA ordered the 
relevant court to hold “a live hearing.”344 
In its unpublished Petetan v. State decision, also from 2017, the 
Texas CCA noted that Moore I detailed how “this Court’s failure to 
consider current medical standards and reliance on Briseno failed to 
comply with the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents.”345 
These errors, the Texas CCA ruled, warranted “grant[ing] rehearing” of 
the case.346 Justice Newell concurred, agreeing that Moore I “clearly 
invalidate[d] portions of our Briseno standard,” while also recognizing 
that “Moore [I] appears to [have gone] further than that[.]”347Justice 
Keller dissented and did not perceive Moore I to have any bearing on 
Petetan’s case, despite the opinion appearing after the Texas CCA’s 
ruling in the case in March of 2017.348 Keller adopted this view because 
the court “made a point of saying that appellant’s mental retardation 
claim would fail even without considering the Briseno factors.”349 
Keller reduced Moore I’s significance to a simple rejection of the 
Briseno factors, whereas Newell recognized that the case held broader 
implications, showcasing the Justices’ divergent interpretations of 
Moore I. 
In Ex parte Sosa, the Texas CCA acknowledged that Moore I “held 
that the Briseno factors, based upon superseded medical standards, 
create an unacceptable risk that a person with intellectual disabilities 
will be executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”350 The Texas 
CCA “determine[d] that the trial court’s findings [were] supported by 
the record,” and Sosa was intellectually disabled.351 Thus, the Texas 
CCA pronounced that “[r]elief is granted on Applicant’s intellectual 
 
344 See Ex parte Guevara, NO. WR-63,926-03, 2018 WL 2717041 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Jun. 6, 2018) (per curiam); Ex parte Williams, NO. WR-71,296-03, 2018 WL 
2717039 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 5, 2018) (per curiam); Ex parte Jean, NO. WR-
84,327-01, 2017 WL 2859012 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 28, 2017) (per curiam) 
(Newell, J., not participating). 
345 Petetan v. State, NO. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 4678670, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 
18, 2017) (per curiam). 
346 Id. 
347 Id. (Newell, J., concurring). 
348 Id. at *2 (Keller, J., dissenting). 
349 Id. 
350 Ex parte Sosa, NO. AP-76,674, 2017 WL 2131776, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 
3, 2017) (per curiam) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017)). 
351 Id. 
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disability claim. Applicant’s sentence is reformed to a term of life 
imprisonment.”352 
In its 2018 Ex parte Wood decision, the Texas CCA concluded that 
Wood was “not entitled to relief” despite the fact that many of the 
habeas court’s findings hinged on “the Briseno factors and possible 
alternate causes of any adaptive deficits,” which the Texas CCA 
conceded “[were] no longer viable after the Moore cases.”353 Perhaps 
sensing its decision’s strained credibility, even for a judiciary as 
notoriously insubordinate as the Texas CCA,354 the court rationalized 
that, “[t]he Moore decisions changed the legal analysis for reviewing 
intellectual-disability claims in Texas, but Applicant’s evidence relating 
to intellectual disability is already in the record.”355 Consequently, the 
court denied Wood “the opportunity to further develop the 
evidence[.]”356 Justice Newell concurred, and interpreted Moore I as 
“rejecting our reliance upon the infamous ‘Briseno factors’” in favor of 
“current diagnostic standards.”357 He perceived the Moore I opinion to 
be problematic, however, because: 
to the extent that Applicant can build a claim of intellectual 
disability upon the shifting sands of clinical psychological standards 
detailed in Moore [I], this case demonstrates that the determination 
 
352 Id. 
353 Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 
354 See Michael Hall, And Justice for Some, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 2004), 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/and-justice-for-some/ 
[https://perma.cc/WP5P-6ZKJ]. 
[T]ime and again over the past decade, whenever [Texas CCA] 
judges have had a choice between tolerating bad behavior by 
prosecutors and police or enforcing the due process rights of 
criminals, they have sided with the state. For some judges it has been 
a conscious choice, a turning away from the court’s previous 
technicality-based, defense-oriented decisions. For others it has 
been merely a reflection of their prosecutorial backgrounds. For all, 
it is politics: The judges on the CCA are elected politicians and are 
careful to paint themselves as tough on crime and criminals, 
whatever the cost. And so they have developed an overriding 
concern with preventing further hearings, appeals, and new 
trials . . . . [O]ver and over before the CCA, finality has trumped 
everything else, especially fairness. 
 Id. 
355 Wood, 568 S.W.3d at 681. 
356 Id. at 682. 
357 Id. at 685, 686 (Newell, J., concurring). 
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of intellectual disability has become untethered from the original 
rationale for the exception to the imposition of the death penalty 




Justice Alcala dissented, insisting that Wood’s “intellectual 
disability claim . . . must be reconsidered in light” of Moore I because 
it “failed to conform with the diagnostic framework endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Moore [I][.]”359 Alcala also alleged that the “Court’s 
majority opinion employs the same type of incorrect intellectual 
disability analysis that it has been conducting mistakenly for over a 
decade since issuing its opinion in Ex parte Briseno.”360 Expounding 
further, Alcala declared “[t]he instant majority opinion continues to 
selectively focus on only the IQ scores and adaptive strengths that would 
support a determination that applicant is not intellectually disabled, 
despite current medical standards suggesting that this is an inappropriate 
approach to intellectual-disability determinations.”361 Alcala concluded 
by asserting that Wood should receive the opportunity “for further 
evidentiary development and factual findings under the proper 
standard[,]” because the trial court’s “fact findings and conclusions fail 
to comport with the current medical diagnostic framework[.]”362 
In its unpublished 2018 Thomas v. State decision, the Texas CCA 
conveyed that Moore I “reject[ed] the use of the factors this Court set 
out in Ex parte Briseno to evaluate a defendant’s adaptive functioning,” 
because their “application . . . departs from current medical standards 
and clinical practice[.]”363 The court emphasized that, while the defense 
expert evaluated Thomas according to the DSM-5, the state-appointed 
expert “conflated the old and the current standard” by allowing “his 
opinion [to be] guided by the Briseno factors.”364 Equally concerning, 
the state “sought examples of adaptive abilities which fell within the 
 
358 Id. at 686. The original rationale that Newell mentions is, presumably, that 
persons with intellectual disabilities are less morally culpable for their crimes, and 
therefore undeserving of the criminal justice system’s most severe punishment—
death. 
359 Id. (Alcala, J., dissenting). 
360 Id. at 687. 
361 Id. 
362 Id. at 688. 
363 Thomas v. State, NO. AP-77,047, 2018 WL 6332526, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 
5, 2018) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049–51 (2017)). 
364 Id. at *17. 
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Briseno factors.”365 As a result, the Texas CCA determined, that it 
“cannot ignore [the state expert’s] obvious adherence to the Briseno 
factors in forming the basis for his opinions that he presented to the 
jury.”366 The court reasoned, “it would be a violation of Thomas’s due 
process rights if the jury’s determination of intellectual disabilit[ies] 
was based on misleading expert testimony” and therefore “Thomas 
[was] entitled to a new punishment hearing.”367 
Finally, in 2019, the Texas CCA granted a stay of execution in Ex 
parte Milam, due to “recent changes in the law pertaining to the issue of 
intellectual disabilit[ies]” triggered by that decision in Moore I.368 The 
purpose of this stay was to provide the trial court with sufficient time to 
conduct “a review of the merits of [Milam’s] claims.”369 Justice 
Richardson concurred, commenting, “[t]here was no legal basis upon 
which to challenge the use of the Briseno factors as the proper 
diagnostic standard for evaluating claims of intellectual disabilit[ies]” 
prior to Moore I.370 Therefore, Milam clearly “did not forfeit then his 
right to a stay of execution now simply because his trial and writ 
attorneys lacked clairvoyance.”371 Justice Yeary dissented, remarking 
that “it does not appear that [Milam] has challenged Briseno at any 
earlier stage in these capital murder proceedings. If there was any trial 
objection, it was not reiterated and pursued on direct appeal.”372 
According to Yeary, “[a]t least as of 2010, it is clear enough that an 
argument could reasonably have been fashioned . . . that Briseno should 
be overruled.”373 For this reason, Yeary believed that Milam “should 
therefore have raised his intellectual disability claim in his initial writ 
application.”374 Moreover, Yeary objected to the Majority opinion 
because: 
to authorize the convicting court to entertain [Milam’s] claim now, 




367 Id. at *19. 
368 Ex parte Milam, NO. WR-79,322-02, 2019 WL 190209, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Jan. 14, 2019) (per curiam). 
369 Id. 
370 Id. (Richardson, J., concurring). 
371 Id. 
372 Id. (Yeary, J., dissenting). 
373 Id. 
374 Id. 
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when the argument was readily available to be raised in his initial 
writ application, would violate both the letter and certainly the spirit 
of our codified abuse-of-the-writ provision[.]
375
 
B. The Standard Error of Measurement 
Courts from ten different states cited Moore I or Moore II to address 
aspects of IQ testing, including the SEM. The Alabama CCA, for 
example, interpreted Moore I to require states to evaluate defendants for 
adaptive deficits when their IQ score, adjusted for the SEM, showed 
evidence of subaverage intellectual functioning according to current 
medical standards.376 In a separate case, the Alabama CCA interpreted 
Moore I as supporting the use of a universal “standard error of 
measurement of 5” that must be applied to every defendants’ IQ score, 
with adjusted scores of 70 or lower satisfying the first prong for 
intellectual disabilities.377 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
observed in another case that Moore I criticized the Texas CCA for 
“disregarding the defendant’s lower IQ scores and failing to consider 
‘the standard error of measurement.’”378 Subsequently, the court 
acknowledged that 
[i]t is undisputed that Carroll’s IQ score of 71, adjusted for the 
standard of measurement, yields a range of 66 to 76. Indeed, the 
Court of Criminal Appeals found that [the] lower end of Carroll’s 
score range falls at or below 70. Thus, there is no dispute that Carroll 
has [satisfied the first prong for intellectual disabilities].
379
 
In the 2019 Graham v. State case, the Alabama CCA considered Moore 
I to reiterate Hall’s stipulation that states must examine all evidence of 
intellectual disabilities, even in instances where a defendant fails to 
meet the first prong for intellectual disabilities by scoring above 70 on 
all IQ tests, properly adjusted for the SEM.380 
The California Supreme Court explained that Moore I “dictates that 
[this court] must also consider petitioner’s adaptive functioning” 
because: (1) “[p]etitioner has two IQ scores that fall at or below 70 
without adjustment for the standard error of measurement”; and (2) 
“[h]is score of 73 on the WAIS-R yields a range of 68 to 78 or, if 
 
375 Id. 
376 Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177, 197 n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017). 
377 Carroll I, 300 So. 3d, 51, 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017). 
378 Carroll II, 300 So. 3d, 59, 63 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)). 
379 Id. (citations omitted). 
380 Graham v. State, 299 So. 3d 273, 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019). 
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rescored as 71, produces a range of 66 to 76.”381 In Kansas, the state’s 
supreme court noted that Moore I deemed the Texas CCA’s “analysis 
of Moore’s IQ scores” unacceptable in light of Hall 
because it failed to account for the standard error of measurement; 
and because Moore had an IQ of 74, when adjusted for the standard 
error of measurement he had an IQ range of 69-79. This meant the 
lower end of the range fell below 70, so the Texas Court was 
required under Hall to consider Moore’s adaptive functioning.
382
 
The Florida Supreme Court claimed that “Moore [I] generally 
embodies a simple affirmation of the principles announced in Hall in 
Wright v. State.”383 The Florida Supreme Court did not take issue with 
how the post-conviction court handled the case because it 
“acknowledged that Wright’s IQ score range–adjusted for the SEM–fell 
into the borderline ID range and the lowest end of the range dipped 1 
point beneath 70; therefore, Wright was allowed to offer evidence of 
adaptive functioning.”384 Accordingly, Florida permitted defendants 
who scored 70 or lower on an IQ test, after incorporating the SEM, to 
present evidence of their alleged adaptive deficits.385 Contrary to current 
medical standards, however, the court argued that “[n]either Hall nor 
Moore [I] requires a significantly subaverage intelligence finding when 
one of many IQ scores falls into the ID range.”386 The court rejected the 
proposition that an IQ test score at or below 70, once adjusted for the 
SEM, necessarily qualified a defendant as having met the first criteria 
for intellectual disabilities. 
While this interpretation is clearly an outlier, the Florida Supreme 
Court sought to conceal its departure from Supreme Court precedent by 
claiming that its decision did, in fact, comport with Hall and Moore I. 
The court asserted it did “not employ a strict cutoff, and consider[ed] 
other evidence of ID when clinical experts would do the same.”387 This 
assertion is dubious, however, because the Moore II Court ruled that 
Moore met the first criteria for intellectual disabilities on the basis that 
“Moore’s intellectual testing indicated his was a borderline case, but 
that he had demonstrated sufficient intellectual-functioning deficits to 
 
381 In re Lewis, 417 P.3d 756, 766 (Cal. 2018). 
382 State v. Thurber, 420 P.3d 389, 447 (Kan. 2018). 
383 Wright II, 256 So. 3d 766, 771 (Fla. 2018). 
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require consideration of the second criterion—adaptive functioning.”388 
Here, the Supreme Court is likely referencing Moore I, where it noted: 
(1) “Moore’s score of 74, adjusted for the standard error of 
measurement, yield[ed] a range of 69 to 79”; and (2) “[b]ecause the 
lower end of Moore’s score range falls at or below 70, the CCA had to 
move on to consider Moore’s adaptive functioning.”389 Moreover, the 
Moore II Court described the first prong as “primarily a test-related 
criterion.”390 The proper way to understand the Court’s instructions, 
therefore, is that an IQ score at or below 70, once the SEM has been 
incorporated, satisfies the first prong, but does not qualify the defendant 
as intellectually disabled unless they also meet the adaptive deficit 
criteria. Indeed, the Moore I Court said as much when it wrote: 
we do not end the intellectual-disability inquiry, one way or the 
other, based on Moore’s IQ score. Rather, in line with Hall, we 
require that courts continue the inquiry and consider other evidence 
of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted for 




The Florida Supreme Court offered no explanation as to why Wright’s 
IQ score of 69 did not meet the first prong for intellectual disabilities, 
and it erroneously reached its conclusion only after disregarding clear 
Court instructions and current medical standards.392 
Discussing Moore I, the Supreme Court of Kentucky remarked that 
“the prevailing tone of the U.S. Supreme Court’s examination of this 
issue suggests that a determination based solely on IQ score, even after 
 
388 Moore II, 139 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2019). 
389 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017). 
390 Moore II, 139 S. Ct. at 668 (citing DSM–5 supra note 180, at 37). 
391 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1050. 
392 The United States Supreme Court recognized that the DSM–5 represented current 
medical standards, id. at 1048. The standard states that 
Intellectual functioning is typically measured with individually 
administered and psychometrically valid, comprehensive, culturally 
appropriate, psychometrically sound tests of intelligence. 
Individuals with intellectual disability have scores of approximately 
two standard deviations or more below the population mean, 
including a margin for measurement error (generally +5 points). On 
tests with a standard deviation of 15 and a mean of 100, this involves 
a score of 65-75 (70 ± 5). Clinical training and judgment are required 
to interpret test results and assess intellectual performance. 
 DSM–5 supra note 180, at 37. 
54 UMass Law Review v. 16 | 2 
proper statistical-error adjustments have been made, is highly 
suspect[.]”393 The Kentucky court arrived at this understanding despite 
saying, “[i]t is also true that the U.S. Supreme Court seems to suggest 
that a defendant’s IQ score, after adjusting for statistical error, acts as 
the preliminary inquiry that could foreclose consideration of other 
evidence of intellectual disabilit[ies], depending on the score.”394 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Kentucky proclaimed that “routine 
application of a bright-line test alone to determine death-penalty-
disqualifying intellectual disability is an exercise in futility.”395 Thus, 
the court held “that any rule of law that states that a criminal defendant 
automatically cannot be ruled intellectually disabled and precluded from 
execution simply because he or she has an IQ of 71 or above, even after 
adjustment for statistical error, is unconstitutional.”396 Accordingly, the 
court struck down “KRS 532.130(2), a statute with an outdated test for 
ascertaining intellectually [sic] disability[.]”397 
In State v. Russell, the Mississippi Supreme Court overturned the 
lower court’s finding that Russell was intellectually disabled.398 While 
incarcerated, Russell incurred two separate charges: (1) capital murder 
for killing a corrections officer, for which he was convicted and 
sentenced to death;399 and (2) aggravated assault of a corrections officer 
while on death row.400 During the aggravated assault case, Russell was 
evaluated by two state experts and a defense expert for a total of “three 
psychological tests” to determine whether “he was competent to confess 
voluntarily and to stand trial” and whether he “was not insane” during 
 
393 Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2018). 
394 Id. 
395 Id. at 6. 
396 Id. 
397 Id. at 2. The statute at issue provided that “[a] defendant with significant 
subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with substantial deficits 
in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period is referred 
to in KRS 532.135 and 532.140 as a defendant with a serious intellectual 
disability. ‘Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning’ is defined 
as an intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 532.130(2) (West 2012), invalidated by Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 
S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2018) (statute language enabling a “bright-line” IQ score finding 
was counterintuitive to the diagnostic framework of the medical community). 
398 State v. Russell, 2015-KA-00245-SCT (¶ 27) (Miss. 2017). 
399 Id. at (¶ 6). 
400 Id. at (¶ 8). 
2021 Modern Application of Moore v. Texas 55 
the commission of the offense.401 Years later, the state requested access 
to Russell so that it could evaluate him for intellectual disabilities in 
conjunction with the capital case.402 The defense objected to the state’s 
request because the state had already evaluated Russell during the 
aggravated assault case.403 When asked why he sought access, the state 
expert testified that he desired to “administer the most up-to-date” 
version of the IQ test Russell had previously taken, and to “test Russell 
for adaptive-functioning deficits—something that he and his colleagues 
did not assess” during the initial evaluation.404 
The trial judge “decided no further testing was needed to form an 
expert Atkins opinion,” and subsequently “ruled the State had not shown 
good cause to administer any further tests.”405 From the trial court’s 
perspective, allowing the state expert to evaluate Russell on a second 
occasion would place the defense at a disadvantage.406 During the Atkins 
hearing, the defense expert presented evidence that Russell was 
“intellectually disabled, based on Russell’s prior IQ scores, his 
adaptive-functioning deficits, and his placement in special-education 
classes, indicating onset prior to age eighteen.”407 When given the 
chance, “the State announced it would not present any witnesses.”408 
Accordingly, the trial court found sufficient evidence of Russell’s 
intellectual disabilities and “entered an order vacating Russell’s death 
sentence.”409 
Upon appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that “the trial 
court abused its discretion when it ruled the State had ‘adequate 
opportunity’ and information to evaluate Russell’s Atkins claim.”410 The 
court based its holding on the fact that “the State doctors were not 
ordered to and did not evaluate Russell’s claim that he was intellectually 
disabled[]” during their interviews with Russell in association with the 
aggravated assault case.411 The state, therefore, “was not seeking a 
 
401 Id. at (¶ 12). 
402 Id. at (¶ 13). 
403 Id. 
404 Id. at (¶ 15). 
405 Id. at (¶ 17). 
406 Id. 
407 Id. at (¶ 18). 
408 Id. at (¶ 19). 
409 Id. 
410 Id. at (¶ 21). 
411 Id. at (¶ 22). 
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second, duplicate Atkins evaluation. It was requesting the Atkins 
evaluation.”412 The court further explained, “[t]he State made this 
request not to redo what had already been done[,]”413 but, rather, its 
expert sought to adhere to current medical standards by: (1) gathering 
data to assess the issue at hand rather than repurposing old data collected 
for a different reason; (2) assessing Russell’s adaptive deficits for the 
first time; and (3) administering the most recent version of the IQ test 
previously taken by Russell.414 By ruling as it did, the trial court erred 
because “instead of being informed by the medical expert on what 
assessments are necessary, it was the trial judge who informed the 
expert what assessments were sufficient.”415 As a result, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court found that “the trial court not only improperly stepped 
into the role of a forensic psychologist, but it also broke with this 
Court’s precedent recognizing that the medical expert is in the best 
position to determine what testing is sufficient to form an opinion on the 
petitioner’s intellectual disability.”416 In concluding its reasoning, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court declared that, “[b]ecause our Atkins 
procedures clearly contemplate the State responding to the petitioner’s 
evidence with its own expert opinion, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it restricted the State in this way.”417 
Chief Justice Waller dissented, pointing out that “[t]he State, aware 
of Russell’s Atkins claim, requested that Russell be evaluated at one 
time for the purposes of both cases[.]”418 He explained that “Russell 
agreed to this procedure on the condition that, to the extent possible, the 
results of his mental evaluation in the assault case would serve the 
State’s purposes for the Atkins claim and that he would not be subjected 
to additional testing.”419 Waller also recognized that “the reports from 
Russell’s [initial] psychological evaluations were not rendered 
meaningless in the Atkins context simply because they did not contain 
conclusions on Russell’s intellectual disability.”420 Moreover, Waller 
quoted the state’s expert who, in a previous case, declined to administer 
 
412 Id. at (¶ 23). 
413 Id. 
414 Id. at (¶ ¶ 23, 24, 25). 
415 Id. at (¶ 26). 
416 Id. 
417 Id. at (¶ 27). 
418 Id. 
419 Id. 
420 Id. at (¶ 33). 
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tests assessing adaptive functioning because he considered the practice 
unsound given how long the defendant had spent in prison.421 Waller 
concluded that if the state expert truly sought to assess Russell’s 
adaptive deficits, he could have used acceptable methods that did “not 
require direct contact with or testing of the defendant.”422   
In his dissent, Waller also observed that the Moore I Court 
considered Moore to have met the first prong for intellectual disabilities 
“based solely on the results of an IQ test administered to the defendant 
in 1989, even though the defendant’s Atkins hearing was held in 2014 
and the defendant had taken more recent IQ tests.”423 In other words, 
Waller thought Moore I signified that an IQ score of 70 or below, once 
adjusted for the SEM, satisfied the first prong for intellectual disabilities 
regardless of how long ago that IQ test had been administered—
provided that the test in question was consistent with the current medical 
standards at the time of administration. Waller noted that the state and 
defense experts agreed that Russell’s scores should be adjusted for the 
Flynn Effect,424 which decreased his scores to “66 and 72.”425 
Additionally, the state expert had “testified that the [tests] were the most 
up-to-date IQ tests available at the time they were administered to 
Russell.”426 Therefore, Waller considered “the psychological testing 
already available to the trial court [to have] established that Russell 
satisfied” the first prong for intellectual disabilities.427 Furthermore, 
 
421 Id. at (¶ 35). 
422 Id. 
423 Id. at (¶ 37) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)). 
424 The Flynn Effect refers to the fact that, over time, individuals have been scoring 
higher on IQ tests compared to the population that the test was normed on. Thus, 
comparing a recent score with the average score obtained by an outdated 
population artificially inflates the recent score. In death penalty cases, this 
increases the risk that persons with intellectual disabilities will be incorrectly 
assessed as intellectually able and subsequently executed. In order to counteract 
the Flynn Effect, IQ scores are lowered according to set practices. See DSM–5, 
supra note 180 at 37 (defining the Flynn effect as “overly high scores due to out-
of-date test norms”). See also Frank M. Gresham & Daniel J. Reschly, Standard 
of Practice and Flynn Effect Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 49 INTELL. & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 131 (2011); John H. Blume, Sheri Johnson & 
Christopher W. Seeds, Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions 
of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
689 (2009). 
425 Russell, 2015-KA-00245-SCT at (¶ 37). 
426 Id. at (¶ 38). 
427 Id. at (¶ 37). 
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“[t]he state presented no evidence suggesting that those scores were 
invalid or that they could not be used in an Atkins analysis[,]” and the 
State’s expert himself testified that “Russell probably would produce a 
lower score on the [most recent version of the IQ test] than he did on 
the [now-outdated version that he took].”428 Waller concluded 
the trial court correctly weighed the need for additional intelligence 
testing against the existing evidence of Russell’s intellectual 
functioning, along with the risk of testing error, and determined that 
the State had not shown good cause to conduct additional testing. 
Under these facts, I would not find that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the State’s request to have its own expert 
administer the [newest version of the IQ test] to Russell.
429
 
In Johnson v. State, Justice Stith dissented from the majority’s 
finding that Johnson’s counsel was not ineffective despite his failure to: 
(1) recognize that Johnson’s IQ, which was “between 53 and 63,” would 
have likely exempted him from the death penalty during an Atkins 
hearing; and (2) familiarize himself with intellectual disabilities 
diagnostic criteria and relevant Supreme Court cases.430 According to 
Stith, Moore I demonstrated that if a defendant’s IQ score, adjusted for 
the SEM, is 70 or lower, courts must assess defendants for evidence of 
adaptive functioning.431 Stith expounded upon what she perceived to be 
the correct procedures for evaluating capital defendants’ intellectual 
disabilities, writing, 
[t]o determine whether there is evidence of low intellectual 
functioning, clinicians give multiple IQ scores and account for a 
standard error of measurement (five points) when an IQ score is 
close to, but above 70. Then, to determine whether this low IQ is 
accompanied by adaptive behavior deficits, clinicians, preferably 
using standardized instruments, should examine records from 
childhood and interview those who knew the defendant, looking 
only at whether the defendant, when in a non-penal environment, 
exhibited deficits in conceptual, social, or practice skills. Finally, 
some evidence of the deficits should be available before age 18.
432
 
In State v. Ryan, the Oregon Supreme Court considered a non-
capital case involving sexual abuse perpetrated by an intellectually 
 
428 Id. at (¶ 39). 
429 Id. 
430 Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 908–09 (Mo. 2019) (Stith, J., dissenting). 
431 Id. at 915. 
432 Id. at 916 (internal citations omitted). 
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disabled defendant.433 Extensive evidence, accepted by both the state 
and defense, demonstrated that Ryan was intellectually disabled.434 The 
Oregon Supreme Court cited Moore I to support its claim that, “even for 
offenders who test above that cut-off IQ score [of 70–75], deficits in the 
offender’s adaptive functioning are relevant to a determination of 
intellectual disability.”435 Because the Supreme Court “in Atkins 
repeatedly emphasized the relevance of intellectual disability in 
determining both the gravity of an offense and the severity of its 
penalty,” the Oregon Supreme Court found that “[e]vidence of an 
offender’s intellectual disability . . . is relevant to a proportionality 
determination where sentencing laws require the imposition of a term of 
imprisonment without consideration of such evidence.”436 Similarly, the 
court affirmed that “the undisputed evidence at sentencing showed that 
defendant is an intellectually disabled offender who has an IQ score 
between 50 and 60, a full ten to twenty points below the cutoff IQ score 
for the intellectual function prong of the intellectual disability definition 
recognized in Hall.”437 As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court held that 
“the trial court erred . . . because [it] failed to consider evidence of 
defendant’s intellectual disability when that evidence, if credited, would 
establish that the sentence would be arguably unconstitutional because 
it shows that defendant’s age-specific intellectual capacity fell below 
the minimum age level of criminal responsibility for a child.”438 The 
 
433 State v. Ryan, 396 P.3d 867, 868 (Or. 2017). 
434 A total of four mental health professionals conducted evaluations and 
[a]ll the evaluators diagnosed defendant with intellectual 
disabilities. The first evaluator reported an IQ score of 50 for 
defendant, the most recent IQ test scored defendant at 60, and each 
evaluator found significant impairment in his adaptive functioning. 
Defendant represented to the court that he functioned at an 
approximate mental age of 10, and the state did not dispute that 
representation. 
 Id. at 869. 
435 Id. at 875. In other words, even if a defendant failed to obtain IQ test scores at or 
below 70, once adjusted for the SEM, and therefore was considered to have not 
met the first prong of the intellectual disabilities diagnostic criteria, Oregon’s 
Supreme Court understood Moore I to still require the state courts to provide the 
defendant the opportunity to present evidence of adaptive deficits. Id. 
436 Id. at 877. 
437 Id. at 879. 
438 Id. at 868–69. 
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court concluded by vacating Ryan’s “75-month prison term”439 and 
remanding to the circuit court for a new sentence that considered 
evidence of his intellectual disabilities.440 
For the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Moore I “established that 
IQ test scores must be considered while accounting for any SEM.”441 
This court recognized Moore I provided “the presence of other sources 
of imprecision in administering the test to a particular 
individual . . . cannot narrow the test-specific standard error range.”442 
Therefore, it interpreted Moore I to prohibit state courts from using a 
SEM less than +/- 5 points.443 The court also considered that the Moore 
I Court 
held that an IQ score in the ranges present in that case did not end 
the inquiry, reaffirming Hall. [Instead, it was] necessary to consider 
other evidence of intellectual disability, particularly adaptive 




In light of these instructions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
criticized the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) court for 
“discount[ing] the results of the 1987 WAIS-R test based on the 
possibility that testing conditions affected the result.”445 Pennsylvania’s 
Supreme Court concluded that the PCRA court erred when it “argued 
particular circumstances justified disregarding the lower end of the 
SEM score.”446 
The Texas CCA did not share the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s 
interpretation of Moore I. In Ex parte Wood, the Texas CCA deferred to 
the habeas court’s judgment in discarding IQ test scores that “ranged 
 
439 Id. at 869. 
440 Id. at 880. 
441 Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 377 (Pa. 2019). 
442 Id. at 377–78 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)). 
443 Id. at 388. 
444 Id. at 387. The court noted that “Moore’s IQ scores included one score of 78 with 
none under 70.” Id. 
445 Id. at 388. The test in question “yielded an overall [IQ] score of 69[,]” which is 
below the threshold required to qualify a capital defendant as a person with 
intellectual disabilities. Id. at 379. 
446 Id. at 388. In Moore I, for example, the Supreme Court noted that the Texas CCA 
relied on Moore’s poor academic performance and the depressive symptoms he 
was experiencing when he took the IQ test to justify disregarding the lower bound 
of the test, which was 69 after subtracting the SEM of 5 from the initial score of 
74. 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1047 (2017). 
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from 64 to 111[,]” ultimately retaining a single “test [that] yielded a full 
scale IQ score of 75 . . . .”447 Based on this test, the habeas court ruled 
that Wood failed to meet the first criteria for intellectual disabilities.448 
The Texas CCA affirmed the habeas court’s decision, writing: 
Because the only test with any validity yielded an IQ score that, even 
accounting for standard measurement error, is not within the range 
for intellectually disabled persons and because even that score 
appears to understate Applicant’s intelligence due to the strong 
evidence of malingering, Applicant has failed the first prong of the 




The Texas CCA’s decision is suspect on multiple fronts. First, the 
Hall Court observed that “an individual with an IQ test score ‘between 
70 and 75 or lower’ may show intellectual disability by presenting 
additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning.”450 
As such, Supreme Court precedent definitively established that 
defendants who scored 75 on an IQ test satisfied the first criteria for 
intellectual disabilities, and courts should proceed to the second prong 
and assess them for adaptive deficits. Second, the broader significance 
of Hall is that the Court ruled “[i]t is not sound to view a single factor 
as dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment[;]” however, 
 
447 Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 
448 Id. The IQ test in question had an ascribed “measurement error range of 71 to 80 
(-4, +5).” Id. 
449 Id. at 680–81. 
450 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 722 (2014) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 309 n.5 (2002)). Meaning, the Hall Court explicitly adopted this aspect of 
current medical standards as its own, removing doubt as to whether states had 
discretion to use a stricter cutoff score. Id. at 723. This language superseded that 
of the Atkins Court, which declared that “an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower . . . is 
typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the 
mental retardation definition.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002). 
While the Atkins Court may have left some doubt as to whether states could justify 
using a cutoff score other than 75, the Hall Court clearly closed this loophole by 
removing the word “typically.” In Atkins, the Supreme Court referenced a 
psychiatry textbook to note that current medical standards “typically” considered 
scores ranging between 70 and 75 as meeting the first criteria for establishing 
intellectual disabilities despite referencing typical current medical standards. Id. 
However, the Atkins Court did not explicitly require states to use this cutoff, on 
the contrary, the Court left it to the states to decide how to assess intellectual 
disabilities. Id. at 317. 
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that is exactly what the Texas CCA did in Wood.451 Third, by upholding 
the habeas court’s highly suspect SEM of minus four but plus five IQ 
points, the Texas CCA adopted a position that even dissenting Justice 
Alito identified as incompatible with the majority’s decision.452 Ex parte 
Wood, therefore, is not a product of the Texas CCA misinterpreting 
unclear or ambiguous instructions from the Supreme Court, but rather a 
blatant, calculated, and harmful expression of defiance against the 
Court’s unmistakable ruling. The fourth reason Texas’s decision is 
suspect is that even if it was permissible for states to use SEM’s smaller 
than five, the Supreme Court may have rendered disputes over SEM’s 
immaterial by stating that, “[i]n Hall v. Florida, we held that a State 
cannot refuse to entertain other evidence of intellectual disability when 
a defendant has an IQ score above 70.”453 Fifth, the Hall Court 
highlighted the absurdity of “Florida seek[ing] to execute a man because 
he scored a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ test.”454 By upholding the habeas 
court’s SEM of minus four but plus five that produced a range of 71 to 
80, the Texas CCA’s opinion differs from the decision overturned by 
the Hall Court only in semantics.455 Finally, the Moore I Court rejected 
 
451 Hall, 572 U.S. at 723. Expounding upon this principle, the Hall Court indicated 
that “[i]ntellectual disability is a condition, not a number,” and that “an IQ test 
score represents a range rather than a fixed number.” Id. 
452 Although Alito dissented, he recognized that the Court had instituted “a five-point 
margin of error” in order to produce “the number 75 in this case.” Id. at 740 (Alito, 
J., dissenting). Alito’s Hall interpretation appears sound given that the Moore I 
Court applied a five-point SEM when it observed that “Moore’s score of 74, 
adjusted for the standard error of measurement, yield[ed] a range of 69 to 79.” 
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017). The Moore I Court explicitly denounced 
the Texas CCA for “discount[ing] the lower end of the standard-error range 
associated with [Moore’s IQ] scores.” Id. at 1047. In doing so, the Supreme Court 
unequivocally rejected any attempt to shrink the SEM from the five-point margin 
that Hall required. 
453 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1048. On its face, the Moore I Court appears to be endorsing 
the view that no IQ score is too high to justify prohibiting defendants from 
submitting evidence of adaptive deficits for consideration. Critics, however, may 
point out that the Moore I Court also wrote “in line with Hall, we require that 
courts continue the inquiry and consider other evidence of intellectual disability 
where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted for the test’s standard error, falls within 
the clinically established range for intellectual-functioning deficits.” Id. at 1050. 
454 Hall, 572 U.S. at 724. 
455 Both rulings manufactured a scenario where a single point difference on an IQ 
test determined whether the defendant qualified as intellectually disabled and 
exempt from the death penalty. Therefore, despite taking the suspect SEM into 
account, the Texas CCA’s affirmation of the habeas court’s ruling is hard to 
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the Briseno factors partially because they were “an outlier” relative “to 
other States’ handling of intellectual-disability pleas.”456 Therefore, the 
Texas decision in Ex parte Wood is also an outlier because it: (1) used 
a standard error of measurement less than five; and (2) prohibited an 
investigation into adaptive deficits based solely on an IQ score. 457 In 
contrast to Texas, other states have overwhelmingly relied on a standard 
measurement error of +/- five points and allowed inquiries into adaptive 
deficits even if a capital defendant’s IQ score failed to fall below the 
cutoff.458 
 
square with the Hall Court’s de-emphasis of specific IQ scores in favor of 
evidence of adaptive deficits. 
456 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1052. 
457 Ex parte Wood may also be an outlier relative to other Texas CCA cases. In its 
unpublished Thomas v. State opinion, the court noted that the state-retained expert 
testified that, “the numbers attributable to Thomas’s IQ score is a range of 68 to 
75, and that his ‘full scale’ IQ is 71.” NO. AP-77,047, 2018 WL 6332526, at *12 
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2018). Thus, according to the state expert, Thomas’ IQ 
score conveniently fell a single point short of meeting the first prong for 
intellectual disabilities. During cross-examination, however, the state expert 
acknowledged that he did, in fact, consider Thomas to meet the first criteria for 
intellectual disabilities, although his earlier testimony framed the issue as if 
Thomas did not. Id. at *16. For its part, the Texas CCA recognized that 
[a]ccording to the Supreme Court, Bobby Moore’s IQ score of 74, 
adjusted for the standard error of measurement, yielded a range of 
69 to 79, and so, because the lower end of Moore’s score range fell 
at or below 70, this Court had to move on to consider Moore’s 
adaptive functioning. 
 Id. at *3. Thus, in this case, the Texas CCA appeared to interpret Moore I as 
requiring an SEM of +/- 5 and prohibiting states from narrowing this range for 
any reason. 
458 In Carroll v. State, Alabama’s CCA acknowledged that the Moore I Court 
required “a standard error of measurement of 5.” 300 So. 3d 51, 55 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2017). Likewise, in Graham v. State, Alabama’s CCA understood Moore I 
as requiring states to consider evidence of adaptive deficits even when defendants 
scored above 70 in IQ tests. 299 So. 3d 273, 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky deemed “the prevailing tone of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s examination of this issue [to suggest] that a determination 
based solely on IQ score, even after proper statistical-error adjustments have been 
made, [to be] highly suspect.” Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 
2018). The Supreme Court of Kentucky pronounced that “[w]e now conclude and 
hold that any rule of law that states that a criminal defendant automatically cannot 
be ruled intellectually disabled and precluded from execution simply because he 
or she has an IQ of 71 or above, even after adjustment for statistical error, is 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 6. The Oregon Supreme Court expressed the same 
opinion, finding “the Court has made clear that, even for offenders who test above 
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In summary, the Texas CCA erred in its Ex parte Wood decision 
because citing an SEM of minus four from a base IQ test score of 75 in 
order to conclude that Wood “failed the first prong of the intellectual-
disability framework, and there [was] no need to conduct an adaptive-
deficits inquiry[,]”459 is patently unconstitutional in light of Hall and 
Moore I. Justice Alcala said as much in her dissent when she asserted, 
[t]his Court’s majority opinion cherry picks certain IQ scores and 
treats those scores as dispositive evidence of a lack of intellectual 
disability. This Court’s majority opinion acknowledges that 
applicant’s IQ scores range from 64 to 111, but it dismisses low IQ 
scores that would indicate subaverage general intellectual 
functioning as the product of malingering. It uncritically assumes 
the validity of applicant’s higher IQ scores without addressing 
whether the methods used to obtain those scores would still comport 
with current medical diagnostic criteria. And perhaps more 
importantly, this Court’s cherry-picked IQ score of 75 provides a 
worst-case scenario IQ score of 71 based on the ‘measurement error 
range.’ This score is only one point above the cutoff score that would 
place someone in the range of intellectual disability, when the low 
end of the IQ score error range is 70 or below. Under the current 
medical diagnostic framework, it is inappropriate to decide that 
someone is not intellectually disabled by using a strict cutoff score 
taken from a cherry picked IQ test.
460
 
By failing to rein in the habeas court, Alcala contended that: 
this Court’s majority opinion employs the same type of incorrect 
intellectual disability analysis that it has been conducting mistakenly 
for over a decade since issuing its opinion in Ex parte Briseno. The 
instant majority opinion continues to selectively focus on only the 




C. Highlighting Adaptive Deficits 
Courts from nine different states relied on Moore I or Moore II to 
address how they should treat aspects of capital defendants’ adaptive 
deficits. For example, in Carroll v. State, the Alabama CCA correctly 
 
the cut-off IQ score [of 70-75], deficits in the offender’s adaptive functioning are 
relevant to a determination of intellectual disability.” State v. Ryan, 396 P.3d 867, 
875 (Or. 2017). Lastly, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court perceived Moore I to 
prohibit reliance on SEM’s less than the five points described in Hall. 
Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 377–78 (Pa. 2019). 
459 Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 
460 Id. at 687 (Alcala, J., dissenting). 
461 Id. at 686–87 (citation omitted). 
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interpreted Moore I to mean that “courts should not use adaptive 
strengths to negate adaptive deficits.”462 Additionally, that court 
considered Moore I to stipulate “that States may not create their own 
factors for accessing [sic] adaptive deficits if those factors deviate from 
clinical standards.”463 The Supreme Court of Alabama, in turn, 
acknowledged that Moore I required evaluating defendants for adaptive 
deficits, not adaptive strengths.464 Nevertheless, that court appears to 
have focused on Carroll’s adaptive strengths rather than deficits, 
including his ability to read, operate a baking mixer, and make some 
basic foods.465 
The defense expert, on the other hand, found that Carroll displayed 
evidence of adaptive deficits.466 According to the Supreme Court of 
Alabama, “[t]he circuit court’s primary reason for rejecting the defense 
expert’s opinion was that [he] was the only psychologist to conclude 
that Carroll suffered from significant adaptive deficits.”467 Therefore, 
“[b]ecause the experts’ opinions regarding Carroll’s level of adaptive 
functioning . . . were conflicting, it was reasonable for the circuit court 
to look to other evidence of Carroll’s adaptive functioning to reconcile 
the experts’ competing opinions regarding his abilities [and functional 
limitations].”468 Moreover, the circuit court relied on testimony from the 
police officer that interviewed Carroll, who attested 
that Carroll was able to read his Miranda rights before questioning 
him. He stated that Carroll read a sentence on the form out loud to 
him and that, during questioning, he appeared to understand his 
questions. [The officer] also testified that Carroll had eight or nine 
 
462 Carroll I, 300 So. 3d at 55. 
463 Id. 
464 Carroll II, 300 So. 3d 59, 63 (Ala. 2019). 
465 Id. at 65. 
Dr. Ford found that the defendant reads novels, self-help books, and 
the sports page of the newspaper. Dr. Ford found that the defendant 
is able to write letters. The defendant, who has served as a cook in a 
prison kitchen, was able to correctly describe to Dr. Ford: (1) how 
to bake food items such as biscuits; (2) how to use a large mixer, 
and (3) ingredients that were used in some of the food items he made 
as a cook. 
 Id. 
466 Id. 
467 Id. at 67. 
468 Id. at 72 (citation omitted). 
66 UMass Law Review v. 16 | 2 
books in his prison cell, as well as a newspaper clipping about his 
prior conviction and two Jet magazines.
469
 
Based on this information, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that 
after “weighing the evidence presented, the circuit court discredited the 
opinion of [the defense expert], which was within its discretion to 
do.”470 
Despite the Supreme Court of the United States’ criticism of the 
state expert in Moore I for “emphasiz[ing] Moore’s adaptive strengths 
in school, at trial, and in prison”471 and the Texas CCA for 
“overemphasiz[ing] Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths,”472 the 
Supreme Court of Alabama held that it could not “conclude that the 
circuit court exceeded its discretion in concluding that Carroll did not 
have significant or substantial deficits in adaptive functioning.”473 
Given that the circuit court prioritized evidence of Carroll’s reported 
adaptive strengths over testimony from his relatives demonstrating 
numerous adaptive deficits, it is difficult to reconcile the ruling from the 
Supreme Court of Alabama with the principles established in Moore I. 
It is even more challenging to square the Alabama holding with the 
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Moore II, which found that the 
Texas CCA “again relied less upon the adaptive deficits . . . than upon 
Moore’s apparent adaptive strengths.”474 Because the Supreme Court of 
Alabama decided Ex parte Carroll on April 5, 2019, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States decided Moore II on February 19, 2019, it is 
telling that the Supreme Court of Alabama’s opinion makes no reference 
to Moore II. 
In In re Lewis, the California Supreme Court noted that, “[the 
Attorney General] urges a focus on [Lewis Jr.’s] adaptive strengths, 
including successful gambling in Las Vegas, supporting himself 
through illegal activities, maintenance of lasting relationships, and [his] 
 
469 Id. at 73. 
470 Id. 
471 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1047 (2017). 
472 Id. at 1050. 
473 Carroll II, 300 So. 3d at 74. The circuit court, however, reached its conclusion 
largely based on Carroll’s alleged adaptive strengths rather than his deficits. 
Additionally, the circuit court discounted the defense expert’s testimony even 
though the expert provided evidence collected from “interviews of [Carroll’s] 
relatives . . . that [indicated] he had significant deficits in 7 of the 10 areas of 
adaptive functioning.” Id. at 76. 
474 Moore II, 139 S. Ct. 666, 670 (2019). 
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ability to banter with police when questioned.”475 The court recognized, 
however, that the “United States Supreme Court has cautioned against 
overemphasizing perceived adaptive strengths to counter evidence of 
intellectual disability.”476 The California court observed that the “Moore 
[I] court rejected the view that adaptive strengths constitute evidence 
adequate to overcome considerable objective evidence of adaptive 
deficits, noting the medical community focuses the adaptive-
functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”477 As a result, the California 
Supreme Court concluded that evidence of Lewis’s “adaptive behaviors 
[was] substantially supported,” and therefore “[b]ecause he is 
intellectually disabled, [he] is ineligible for execution.”478 
The Florida Supreme Court recognized that Moore I criticized the 
Texas CCA for improperly relying on Moore’s alleged adaptive 
strengths.479 In a revealing statement, however, the Florida Supreme 
Court wrote, “[i]t is uncertain exactly where Moore [I] drew the tenuous 
line of ‘overemphasis’ on adaptive strengths.”480 This comment 
established the groundwork for the Florida Supreme Court to remark 
that, “[a]s lawyers, it seems counterintuitive that courts cannot consider 
connected adaptive strengths because the existence of certain connected 
strengths necessarily illustrates the absence of certain deficits.”481 The 
court expounded: “[f]or example, common sense dictates that if a 
defendant excels in algebra, then that fact demonstrates a lack of 
connected adaptive deficits in math reasoning (i.e., the conceptual 
domain).”482 Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a narrow 
interpretation of Moore I, holding it to prohibit citing adaptive strengths 
in one domain to refute evidence of adaptive deficits in another domain. 
It also asserted that it “did not ‘overemphasize’ Wright’s adaptive 
strengths to an extent that ran afoul of Moore [I].”483 
 




479 Wright II, 256 So. 3d 766, 774 (Fla. 2018). 
480 Id. at 776. 
481 Id. 
482 Id. 
483 Id. Florida’s Supreme Court further quoted Moore I adding emphasis: “even if 
clinicians would consider adaptive strengths alongside adaptive weaknesses 
within the same adaptive-skill domain, neither Texas nor the dissent identifies any 
clinical authority permitting the arbitrary offsetting of deficits against 
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Despite the Florida Supreme Court proclaiming itself in compliance 
with Moore I, it still considered relevant that 
Wright gave extensive testimony at his trial, withstood cross-
examination, and understood the ramifications of waiving his 
penalty phase jury during a waive colloquy. Also, [the court] 
recounted that lay witnesses who knew Wright throughout his life–
including his cousin and aunt–testified that he learned to work in a 
fast-paced shelving job at a grocery store, did not have problems 
understanding them, and knew how to use the city bus system.
484
 
Subsequently, the court decided, “[a]ll of that evidence cuts against a 
finding of adaptive deficits in the conceptual domain.”485 For this 
reason, the Florida Supreme Court argued that, “Wright’s position is 
less about Moore [I] than it is a mere reassertion that his expert . . . was 
more reliable than the State’s[.]”486 Ultimately, the court “conclude[d] 
that the overemphasis issue, as identified by the Supreme Court in 
Moore [I], is not present here because we did not arbitrarily offset 
deficits with unconnected strengths[.]”487 The Florida Supreme Court 
brazenly adopted this view even though the Moore I Court clearly 
communicated that “the medical community focuses the adaptive-
functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”488 
This Florida ruling evokes the Supreme Court’s words in Moore II, 
where the Court criticized the Texas CCA’s decision for “rest[ing] upon 
analysis too much of which too closely resembles what we previously 
found improper.”489 The Florida Supreme Court may be correct that its 
reliance on Wright’s adaptive strengths technically differs from the 
Texas CCA’s focus on Moore’s adaptive strengths, because Florida 
aimed to refute adaptive deficits with related strengths, whereas the 
Texas CCA discounted deficits based on unrelated strengths. 
Nevertheless, the end result of both courts’ analyses is effectively the 
same: compelling evidence of adaptive deficits is blatantly ignored in 
favor of adaptive strengths which, the courts argue, would support a 
 
unconnected strengths in which the [Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] engaged.” 
Id. (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 n.8 (2017)). 
484 Id. at 778 (citation omitted). 
485 Id. 
486 Id. 
487 Id. at 777. 
488 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017). 
489 Moore II, 139 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2019). 
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finding that the defendant is intellectually able, and therefore eligible 
for execution.490 
The Mississippi Supreme Court understood the United States 
Supreme Court, in Moore II, to have “reiterated its warning from Moore 
I, specifically pointing out that trial courts should rely on adaptive-skill 
deficits rather than adaptive skill strengths.”491 One of the issues 
surrounding Carr v. State is that the trial court found “Carr ha[d] 
demonstrated adaptive skill deficits in at least two (2) of the adaptive 
skill areas[.]”492 The Mississippi Supreme Court took issue because “the 
trial court did not find significant adaptive-skill deficits.”493 Justice 
King dissented, calling attention to the “overwhelming evidence that 
[Carr] had significant deficits in several domains of adaptive 
functioning.”494 According to King 
[t]his is not even a case of opposing experts. The evidence showed 
that one expert stated Carr could be intellectually disabled but that 
he was not certain. Yet Carr presented evidence from two experts 
stating that he was intellectually disabled, presented school records 
that showed significant academic deficits, presented testimony 
indicating that Carr had to be told when to tie his shoes and when to 




Consequently, King opined, “clearly the greater weight of the evidence 
showed that Carr was intellectually disabled within the meaning of 
Atkins.”496 
When dissenting from the Supreme Court of Missouri’s majority 
opinion in Johnson v. State, Justice Stith interpreted Moore I as 
criticizing the Texas CCA’s focus on Moore’s alleged adaptive 
 
490 When reading the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Wright v. State (II), one could 
be forgiven for mistaking it for the Texas CCA’s opinions in either Ex parte 
Moore I or Ex parte Moore II, because of the similarities in both tone and intent 
of those decisions. It would be puzzling indeed, therefore, if this decision passed 
constitutional muster. 
491 Carr v. State, 2017-CA-01481-SCT (¶16 n.5) (Miss. 2019). 
492 Id. at (¶34). The trial court described how the defense expert “found deficits in all 
three domains and in 8 of the 10 adaptive skills.” Id. at (¶31). 
493 Id. at (¶34). In Chase v. State, Mississippi’s Supreme Court wrote that “significant 
limitations in adaptive behavior are operationally defined as performance that is 
approximately two standard deviations below the mean[.]” 2013-CA-01089-SCT 
(¶70) (Miss. 2015) (quoting AAIDD–11, supra note 180, at 43). 
494 Carr, 2017-CA-01481-SCT at (¶48) (King, J., dissenting). 
495 Id. at (¶64). 
496 Id. 
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strengths rather than his adaptive deficits.497 Similarly, she argued that 
Moore II, held that “it was inappropriate for the Texas courts to look at 
Moore’s supposed skills through anecdotal evidence from counsel 
regarding Moore’s ability to talk and communicate, rather than focusing 
on the evidence of his deficits in [those] areas.”498 
In its unpublished State v. Covington opinion, the Supreme Court of 
Nevada drew attention to the fact that both the defense and state experts 
“agreed that Covington had significant adaptive deficits.”499 The 
difference, however, was that the defense expert “attributed [those] 
deficits to intellectual disability,” whereas the state expert “insisted that 
they could have resulted from gaps in instruction, antisocial personality 
traits, or chronic substance abuse.”500 The Supreme Court of Nevada 
cited Moore I when determining that 
[the state expert’s] conclusion is infirm because it does not 
recognize that people with intellectual disabilit[ies] often have 
comorbid psychological disorders and such a disorder should not be 
considered evidence that a defendant does not have an intellectual 
disability, nor is a defendant required to show that his adaptive 
deficits are specifically caused by an intellectual disability.
501
 
Additionally, the court found that “[t]he State’s arguments also 
improperly rely on Covington’s adaptive strengths to compensate for 
any asserted deficits,” when the Moore I Court stipulated that “the focus 
is on adaptive deficits rather than any perceived adaptive strengths.”502 
As proof of Covington’s adaptive deficits, the Supreme Court of Nevada 
articulated the following: 
Family members acknowledged that Covington had generally lower 
comprehension than his siblings or peers; was oblivious to the 
consequences of his actions; was unable to follow movie plots, 
 
497 Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 915 (Mo. 2019) (Stith, J., dissenting). 
498 Id. 
499 State v. Covington, No. 71914, 2019 WL 368915, at *2 (Nev. Jan. 22, 2019) 
(unpublished table decision). 
500 Id. 
501 Id. The United States Supreme Court wrote that “many intellectually disabled 
people also have other mental or physical impairments . . . . The existence of a 
personality disorder or mental-health issue, in short, is ‘not evidence that a person 
does not also have intellectual disability.’” Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017) 
(quoting Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 
4151451, at *19.). 
502 Covington, 2019 WL 368915, at *3 (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1050). 
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literature, or conversations; and was gullible, lacked insight into 
others’ emotions, and generally did not engage in the typical 
behaviors of an independent adult, including consistent 
employment, budgeting, and parental problem solving.
503
 
In Commonwealth v. VanDivner, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania recognized Moore I as confirming that when “assessing 
an individual’s adaptive functioning for the purpose of determining 
whether the individual is intellectually disabled under Atkins, the focus 
should be on the individual’s adaptive deficits, rather than his or her 
adaptive strengths.”504 At VanDivner’s Atkins hearing, an expert for the 
defense testified that VanDivner “was incapable of reading a 
newspaper, managing a checkbook, or finding a name in a telephone 
directory.”505 The expert for the State, however, considered the fact that 
VanDivner wrote the sentence “I love you” as evidence that he did not 
possess adaptive deficits, since a witness had previously “testified that 
[he] was unable to write a sentence.”506 The expert “suggested that 
[VanDivner’s] limitations in adaptive functioning in the areas of 
personal care and home-living were the result of [his] substance 
abuse.”507 
At the PCRA hearing, an expert for the State also testified that 
VanDivner could not be intellectually disabled because he possessed a 
Commercial Driver’s License (CDL).508 In response, a witness 
testified that, because she was concerned that [VanDivner] would 
not be able to pass the test on his own, she obtained a copy of the 
CDL manual and quizzed [him] for approximately 2 hours every day 
for a period of two months by reading each question contained in 
the CDL manual, giving [him] the answer, and repeating the process 





504 Commonwealth v. VanDivner, 178 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa. 2018). 
505 Id. at 118. During a subsequent PCRA hearing, an expert for the defense recalled 
asking VanDivner the number of siblings he had which he answered “[by giving] 
the name of two of his siblings.” Id. at 119. His ex-wife also testified how, “during 
their marriage, Appellant did not work, and was unable to dial the telephone, 
prepare a meal, do laundry, shop, use simple tools, read a map, or make simple 
home repairs.” Id. 
506 Id. at 118. 
507 Id. at 120. 
508 Id. 
509 Id. 
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VanDivner only passed the CDL test because it was administered orally, 
rather than in a written fashion, and the witness traveled with him when 
he was trucking in order to maintain his logs and handle money at 
tolls.510 Despite this evidence, the PCRA court found that VanDivner 
was not intellectually disabled.511 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed, citing 
testimony that [VanDivner] was unable to read, write, or perform 
arithmetic; he was at a second-grade reading level; he was unable to 
manage his finances; he worked at a sausage factory and as a disc 
jockey, but required supervision at the sausage factory because he 
had difficulty remembering what spices to include in the sausage 
mix, and assistance in reading song titles when working as a disc 
jockey; he neglected his health by refusing treatment for his 
diabetes; and, although he had several relationships with women and 
eventually was married, all of the relationships ultimately failed.
512
 
The court further reasoned that, “the mere fact that [VanDivner] was 
married several times and maintained relationships with his family does 
not support the conclusion that [he] does not suffer from limited 
adaptive functioning in the area of social skills.”513 The Pennsylvania 
court also criticized the PCRA court for “conclud[ing] that 
[VanDivner’s] ability to learn the content of the CDL study guide and 
pass an oral version of the exam, as well as his ability to maintain 
employment” as a truck driver, implied that he did not have adaptive 
deficits.514 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that “the 
evidence presented at [VanDivner’s] pretrial and PCRA 
hearings . . . clearly demonstrate[d] that he suffers from significant 
adaptive limitations in the areas of conceptual, practical, and social 
skills[.]”515 Therefore, the court commuted his sentence from death to 
life without parole.516  
 
510 Id. at 120–21. 
511 Id. at 121–22. 
512 Id. at 122–23. 
513 Id. at 123. 
514 Id. 
515 Id. at 125. 
516 Id. at 130. Contrary to the PCRA’s characterization, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania observed that VanDivner “earned approximately 9 percent of what 
the average American worker earned at the time, and was not able to hold a job 
for a long period of time . . . . [Furthermore, he] was always accompanied by a 
friend or family member on his trucking trips because Appellant could not read 
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In its subsequent Commonwealth v. Cox decision, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania contended that Moore I “faulted the Texas 
court’s focus on Moore’s adaptive strengths.”517 During the Atkins 
hearing an expert for the defense “testified that the fact [Cox] achieved 
his GED in prison did not disprove the diagnosis of intellectual 
disability . . . [because Cox] only passed on his second try after 14 years 
of preparation in a structured supportive setting.”518 The same expert 
attested “that the failure of [Cox’s] schools to designate him as in need 
of special education did not negate a diagnosis of intellectual 
disability[.]”519 In contrast, the expert for the state referenced Cox’s 
Department of Correction “records that reflected Appellant with normal 
intelligence and adaptations, such as maintaining a job involving an 18-
step protocol, and passing a GED exam.”520 In its opinion, the PCRA 
court “found significant the fact that school authorities never identified 
Appellant as possessing learning disabilities despite a system in place 
to do so.”521 The PCRA court also “found that [the Department of 
Corrections] records do not support a showing of significant deficits in 
adaptive functioning.”522 Following Moore I, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania acknowledged that, “in assessing an individual’s adaptive 
behavior, courts should focus on the existence of any adaptive deficits 
and not rely on adaptive strengths to deny relief.”523 Moreover, the 
Commonwealth asserted that “its witnesses’ overemphasis on 
Appellant’s strengths, including passing a GED exam, and maintaining 
prison employment,” paralleled the expert testimony that the Moore I 
Court forbid.524 After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of 
 
the maps, count the money for the tolls, and had difficulty keeping up with the 
logs.” Id. at 125. 
517 Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 378 (Pa. 2019). 
518 Id. at 380–81. 
519 Id. at 381. 
520 Id. 
521 Id. at 382. 
522 Id. at 383 (“The court noted that [Cox] navigated the procedure for numerous 
grievances while in prison. The court found that [Cox’s] ability to perform a job 
cleaning up blood and bodily fluid spills, which entails a specific multi-step 
protocol, belied any deficit in adaptive functioning.”). 
523 Id. at 386. “[The Commonwealth acknowledged] that the adaptive strengths 
focused on by the PCRA court are comparable to those focused on by the court in 
Moore [I], including the fact Appellant was never placed in a special needs class, 
and his ability to perform menial labor.” Id. at 387. 
524 Id. at 387. 
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Pennsylvania agreed with the Commonwealth, ruling that “the PCRA 
court misplaced its focus on [Cox’s] adaptive strengths as negating the 
evidence of his adaptive deficits.”525 
In a case with strikingly similar facts to VanDivner, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina found differently than Pennsylvania and 
maintained that “the trial court did not base its decision [that Blackwell 
was intellectually able] solely on the fact that Blackwell was able to 
successfully obtain a commercial driver’s license and be employed as a 
truck driver.”526 The trial court had summarized the relevant evidence 
as demonstrating that Blackwell “was able to achieve his goal of 
becoming a commercial truck driver, maintain employment with 
consistent increases in his earnings, and raise two children during his 
twenty-six-year marriage.”527 The expert for the defense “found the 
[adaptive deficit test] results, other records, and additional information, 
demonstrated that Blackwell had adaptive behavior deficits[.]”528 
Contrarily, the expert for the state “relied instead on Blackwell’s 
vocational history after the age of 18, his ability as an adult to obtain a 
Commercial Driver’s license, and the fact that Blackwell was ‘on track’ 
to graduate when he dropped out of high school” in making the 
determination that he did not have adaptive behavior deficits.529 Faced 
with conflicting expert testimony, the trial court found that Blackwell 
was not intellectually disabled because, among other things, “he 
attended school regularly and did not fail a grade until high school, and 
that he was able to earn high school credits before dropping out.”530 
Dissenting Justice Pleicones alleged that the trial court “ignore[d] the 
details which demonstrate[d] Blackwell’s significant limitations, such 
as an inability to manage a household and live alone, to pay bills, etc.”531 
In his dissent, Pleicones wrote, “I fear that the trial judge’s reliance on 
Blackwell’s ‘perceived adaptive strengths’ will be found to have 
 
525 Id. at 392. 
526 State v. Blackwell, 801 S.E.2d 713, 720 (S.C. 2017) cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 985 
(2018). 
527 Id. at 721. 
528 Id. at 739 (Pleicones, J., dissenting). 
529 Id. 
530 Id. 
531 Id. at 740. The majority did not perceive the trial court to have erred because, “as 
required by Moore [I], [it] carefully considered and weighed Blackwell’s adaptive 
strengths against his adaptive deficits.” Id. at 721 n.11 (majority opinion). 
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unconstitutionally skewed his view of the evidence,” since Moore I 
requires examining adaptive deficits rather than adaptive strengths.532 
In his concurring opinion for the Texas CCA in Ex parte Wood, 
Justice Newell described the habeas court as relying on “evidence [that] 
shows how [Wood] has many adaptive strengths.”533 Newell considered 
this emphasis problematic because the Moore I Court “required [states] 
to focus upon adaptive deficits without placing ‘undue emphasis’ upon 
adaptive strengths.”534 Although Newell conceded that “the habeas 
court noted a great amount of evidence showing [Wood’s] adaptive 
strengths, but a dearth of evidence demonstrating adaptive deficits,” he 
nevertheless rejected the claim that “the habeas court, or this 
Court, . . . placed undue emphasis on [Wood’s] adaptive strengths.”535 
Moreover, Newell asserted that “[i]f we completely ignore the existence 
of evidence demonstrating adaptive strengths, then this aspect of the 
inquiry becomes nothing more than a legal choice to credit only 
mitigation evidence” supporting LWOP instead of death.536 Newell 
concluded that “[u]ltimately, Moore [I] does not prohibit courts from 
considering adaptive strengths; it only prohibits placing ‘undue’ 
emphasis upon them.”537 Justice Alcala dissented, alleging that “[t]he 
instant majority opinion continues to selectively focus on only 
the . . . adaptive strengths that would support a determination that 
applicant is not intellectually disabled[.]”538Contrary to the majority’s 
approach, “clinical experts have counseled against viewing the presence 
of adaptive strengths as evidence of the absence of adaptive 
weaknesses.”539 Alcala interpreted Moore I as prohibiting states from: 
(1) relying on adaptive strengths to disprove intellectual disabilities or 
refute adaptive deficits; and (2) disregarding evidence of adaptive 
deficits by attributing those deficits to another disorder or cause.540 
 
532 Id. at 740 n.45 (Pleicones, J., dissenting). 
533 Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Newell, J., 
concurring). 




538 Id. at 687 (Alcala, J., dissenting). 
539 Id. at 688. 
540 The habeas court suggested, for example, “that [Wood’s] troubles in school could 
be due to factors other than intellectual disability,” even though Moore I 
“expressly recognized that other mental or physical impairments are common 
comorbidities in intellectually disabled persons and are ‘not evidence that a person 
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The Texas CCA, in its unpublished Thomas v. State opinion, 
recounted evidence of Thomas’ adaptive deficits reported by the expert 
for the defense: 
[e]ssentially, he didn’t learn to drive. He had problems in school 
being able to read and write and perform math. He had problems 
making change, such that others would take advantage of him. 
Because, when he would go to the store, he wouldn’t know the 
amount of change to get back. 
During those days, there were rotary telephones. He had difficulty 
looking up phone numbers in the phone book, which we don’t have 
to do anymore. But looking that up and making phone calls, he had 
to have assistance doing that type of thing.
541
 
The expert for the state also testified and the Texas CCA determined 
that “[s]ome of the indicators of Thomas’s adaptive skills were books 
that were found in Thomas’s cell that were seventh grade reading level, 
Thomas’s ability to use money, and his ability to read a clock, a 
thermometer, a calendar, etc.”542 The court commented on how the 
expert for the state “concluded that Thomas ha[d] traits and features 
consistent with an anti-social personality,” rather than intellectual 
disabilities.543 The Texas CCA declared, “we find that [the expert for 
the State’s] testimony improperly ‘overemphasized’ Thomas’s 
‘perceived adaptive strengths,’ rather than focusing on adaptive 
deficits.”544 The Texas CCA found that “the State’s position that 
Thomas’s adaptive behaviors stemmed from a personality disorder 
rather than intellectual disability . . . . deviate[d] ‘from [the] prevailing 
 
does not also have intellectual disability.’” Id. at 688 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 
1039, 1051 (2017)). 
541 Thomas v. State, NO. AP-77,047, 2018 WL 6332526, at *10 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Dec. 5, 2018). 
542 Id. at *15. 
543 Id. 
544 Id. at *17 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017) (“In concluding that 
Moore did not suffer significant adaptive deficits, the CCA overemphasized 
Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths . . . . Moore’s adaptive strengths, in the 
CCA’s view, constituted evidence adequate to overcome the considerable 
objective evidence of Moore’s adaptive deficits. But the medical community 
focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”)). Similarly, when 
Justice Newell concurred in Petetan v. State, he summarized Moore I as “noting 
that the medical community focuses adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive 
deficits rather than adaptive strengths and that [the Texas CCA] overemphasized 
the defendant’s adaptive strengths.” No. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 4678670 at *1 n.4 
(Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017). 
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clinical standards.’”545 Accordingly, it held that “Thomas [was] entitled 
to a new punishment hearing.”546 
D. Highlighting Behavior While Incarcerated 
Courts from four different states interpreted Moore I as discouraging 
a focus on defendants’ functioning while in prison. The Supreme Court 
of Alabama in Ex parte Carroll, for example, recognized that Moore I 
“criticized the Texas court for its emphasis on Moore’s improved 
behavior in prison.”547 The Alabama court found that the lower court’s 
decision was reliant upon the testimony of the state’s expert, which 
detailed how “[t]he defendant, who has served as a cook in a prison 
kitchen, was able to correctly describe . . . (1) how to bake food items 
such as biscuits; (2) how to use a large mixer, and (3) the ingredients 
that were used in some of the food items he made as a cook.”548 A 
corrections officer also attested that Carroll “was able to follow 
directions, complete tasks, and never had any problems with 
communicating” while working in the prison kitchen.549 
During its review of the case, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
observed that “the circuit court placed great emphasis on the fact that 
Carroll had passed the GED examination while in prison.”550 
Additionally, the circuit court found the correctional officer’s testimony 
to be “compelling” when he “stated that Carroll followed directions and 
was a good kitchen worker and that he did not have problems 
communicating with Carroll.”551 The investigator associated with the 
case also presented “compelling” evidence when he “testified that 
Carroll had eight or nine books in his prison cell, as well as a newspaper 
clipping about his prior conviction and two Jet magazines.”552 Finally, 
the circuit court found the state expert “to be persuasive” when she 
relayed that Carroll told her: 
 
545 Thomas, 2018 WL 6332526, at *18 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 
(2017) (“The CCA’s consideration of Moore’s adaptive functioning also deviated 
from prevailing clinical standards and from the older clinical standards the court 
claimed to apply.”)). 
546 Id. at *19 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017)). 
547 Carroll II, 300 So. 3d 59, 63 (Ala. 2019). 
548 Id. at 65. 
549 Id. at 66. 
550 Id. at 72. 
551 Id. at 73. 
552 Id. 
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although he had never owned an automatic-teller-machine (“ATM”) 
card, he understood how a card worked because, on one occasion, 
he was disciplined for using an ATM card number in violation of 
prison rules. In addition, Carroll reported to her that he had 
completed the eighth grade and that he had passed the GED 
examination while in prison.
553
 
Based on these testimonies, the circuit court “discredited” the defense 
expert’s testimony that Carroll possessed adaptive deficits.554 The 
Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision of the circuit court, 
ruling it could not find “that the circuit court exceeded its discretion.”555 
Given that the circuit court overwhelmingly relied on testimony about 
Carroll’s functioning in prison to conclude that he did not have adaptive 
deficits, the Supreme Court of Alabama’s affirmation of the circuit court 
appears at odds with its description of Moore I as “criticiz[ing]” this 
practice556 and the subsequent Moore II decision.557 The Supreme Court 
of Alabama failed to find that the circuit court erred by prioritizing 
testimony of Carroll’s alleged adaptive strengths while incarcerated 
over the testimony of the expert for the defense, who properly focused 
on Carroll’s adaptive deficits. 
The Florida Supreme Court interpreted Moore I to forbid an 
“overemphasis on adaptive strengths and improper focus on prison 
conduct.”558 Although the Florida Supreme Court conceded that its 
opinion in Wright v. State “discussed some of Wright’s adaptive 
strengths and behavior in prison” and that “Moore [I], the DSM-5, and 
AAIDD-11 all caution against overemphasis on that type of evidence,” 
the court nevertheless perceived its ruling to comport with Moore I 
because, “the crux of [its] decision rested on the competing expert 
 
553 Id. at 73–74. 
554 Id. at 74. 
555 Id. 
556 Id. at 63. Of relevance here, the Moore I Court wrote, “the [Texas] CCA stressed 
Moore’s improved behavior in prison. Clinicians, however, caution against 
reliance on adaptive strengths developed ‘in a controlled setting,’ as a prison 
surely is.” 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017) (citation omitted) (quoting DSM–5, supra 
note 180, at 38). 
557 Moore II, which had already been decided but was never cited by the Supreme 
Court of Alabama, even more clearly reprimanded the Texas CCA for “rel[ying] 
heavily upon adaptive improvements made in prison.” 139 S. Ct. 666, 671 (2019). 
At the end of its Moore II opinion, the Court declared, “[t]he length and detail of 
the court’s discussion on these points is difficult to square with our caution against 
relying on prison-based development.” Id. 
558 Wright II, 256 So. 3d 766, 775–76 (Fla. 2018). 
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medical testimony of [the state expert] and [the defense expert] instead 
of independently weighing strengths and deficits or focusing on prison 
conduct.”559 Thus the court did not consider itself to have “detrimentally 
rel[ied] on strengths that Wright developed in prison to justify [its] 
conclusion.”560 This ruling is concerning, however, because much of the 
evidence that the state’s expert relied on to refute that Wright possessed 
adaptive deficits consisted of alleged adaptive strengths he 
demonstrated in prison. The Florida Supreme Court summarized this 
evidence as follows: 
Wright: (1) rewrites draft blog entries in his own words; (2) fully 
communicates with other prisoners and prison staff; (3) listens to 
others and takes advice, as evidenced by his brief period requesting 
Kosher meals; (4) understands numbers and time; (5) knows the 
time allocated for prison activities; (6) manages his prison canteen 
fund and pays attention to his monthly statements; (7) managed his 
own funds as an adolescent to buy necessities; (8) conducted basic 
transactions before he was incarcerated; (9) was attentive to time 
and number issues during the examination; (10) identifies his 
attorneys by name and estimates the amount of time they have 
represented him; (11) knows the difference between legal mail and 
regular mail in the prison system; (12) understands that he needs his 
attorneys because he has no legal training; (13) is receptive to the 
suggestions of his attorneys; (14) wants his attorneys to prove that 
he did not commit the crimes for which he was convicted; (15) 
knows that he was sentenced to death and understands the reasoning 
for his sentence; and (16) has performed some work on his case.
561
 
The state expert’s testimony creates the impression that, in order to rule 
as it did in light of Moore I, the Florida Supreme Court simply refused 
to show proper deference to the Supreme Court of the United States 
precedent. 
Justice Pariente, who concurred in the result, identified “[t]he 
important holding” in Moore I as “conduct in prison, a structured 
environment, should not be relied on in assessing adaptive 
functioning.”562 In Pariente’s view, “[w]hile there is nothing wrong with 
mentioning either adaptive strengths or conduct in prison, it is improper 
to rely on either factor to overcome the evidence of adaptive deficits to 
 
559 Id. at 777. When discussing the 2017 case, Florida’s Supreme Court alleged that 
“[t]he only portion of Wright that touched on prison conduct was [its] recitation 
of [the state expert’s] findings.” Id. 
560 Id. 
561 Wright I, 213 So. 3d at 899. 
562 Wright II, 256 So. 3d at 780 (Pariente, J., concurring). 
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deny a defendant’s intellectual disability claim.”563 Pariente 
recommended applying the Moore I Court’s analysis by “focus[ing] on 
the adaptive deficits and not . . . analyzing either adaptive strengths or 
deficits in the context of a prison environment.”564 Nevertheless, 
Pariente agreed with the holding of the majority because, “[r]egardless 
of how this Court explained Wright’s intellectual disability claim in its 
prior opinion, it is clear that the postconviction court properly analyzed 
Wright’s claim.”565 Thus, Pariente ultimately “concur[red] in result but 
[did] not agree with the unnecessary discussion of adaptive strengths 
and prison behavior.”566 
Justice Alcala, in her Ex parte Wood dissent, considered the 
“majority opinion [to] improperly focus on applicant’s adaptive 
strengths and his abilities in a controlled prison setting.”567 Alcala 
observed that “clinical experts . . . . caution against considering 
adaptive strengths arising in controlled settings like a prison.”568 She 
dissented because the majority affirmed a flawed analysis that “fail[ed] 
to comport with the current medical diagnostic framework” required by 
Moore I.569 
E. Discretion Afforded to State Courts 
Initially, in Atkins, the Supreme Court of the United States professed 
to “leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to 
enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of 
sentences.”570 However, after witnessing some courts treat this freedom 
as a license to act in bad faith, the Court clarified in Hall that “Atkins 
did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of 
 
563 Id. at 781. 
564 Id. Expounding upon this proposal, Pariente noted “as the AAIDD correctly 
explains, much of the clinical definition of adaptive behavior is much less relevant 
in prisons, and in fact, a person with [intellectual disability] is likely to appear to 
have stronger adaptive behavior in a structured environment such as a prison than 
in society.” Id. at 782. 
565 Id. at 782–83. 
566 Id. at 783. 
567 Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W. 3d 678, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Alcala, J., 
dissenting). 
568 Id. at 688. 
569 Id. 
570 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986)). 
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the constitutional protection.”571 Indeed, “[i]f the States were to have 
complete autonomy to define intellectual disabilit[ies] as they wished, 
the Court’s decision in Atkins could become a nullity, and the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not become a 
reality.”572 Consequently, the Hall Court considered “Atkins to provide 
substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual disabilit[ies].”573 
In the post-Moore I era, courts from five different states have cited 
Hall to address the degree of discretion that states retain to choose their 
own definitions and procedures for evaluating intellectual disabilities in 
capital cases.574 The Supreme Court of Alabama, for example, alleged 
that Moore I “did not specifically limit states to the definitions set forth 
in the AAIDD-11 and DSM-5.”575 This interpretation is suspect because 
the Moore I Court specifically referred to the DSM-5 and AAIDD-11 as 
“the leading diagnostic manuals” on intellectual disabilities.576 The 
Supreme Court of Alabama may be correct in semantics given that the 
Moore I Court also declared, “being informed by the medical 
community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest 
medical guide[,]”577 but this statement should not be construed to imply 
 
571 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 719 (2014). 
572 Id. at 720–21. 
573 Id. at 721. Nevertheless, following Hall, the Texas CCA remained undeterred in 
its commitment to the fictitious Briseno factors. In response, the Moore I Court 
pronounced that “[t]he medical community’s current standards supply one 
constraint on States’ leeway in this area[,]” before directing states to the DSM–5 
and AAIDD–11 as appropriate current medical standards. 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 
(2017). 
574 In Moore I, the Supreme Court described the DSM–5 and the AAIDD–11 as the 
“leading diagnostic manuals,” thereby establishing them as the current medical 
standards to be applied by state courts. 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017). The Court 
also stipulated that “[t]he medical community’s current standards supply one 
constraint on States’ leeway in this area.” Id. at 1053. Based on these principles, 
states clearly cannot find someone intellectually able when the practices outlined 
in the DSM–5 or the AAIDD–11 would consider them intellectually disabled. 
What is less clear is whether the Court intended to grant other materials published 
by the APA or AAIDD a similar status as the DSM–5 and AAIDD–11, or whether 
it perceived a difference between the clinical manuals published by the 
organizations and their other views, as expressed in written publications. In other 
words, do other publications besides the DSM–5 and AAIDD–11 from the APA 
and AAIDD qualify as current medical standards or is this designation reserved 
solely for the clinical manuals? 
575 Carroll II, 300 So. 3d 59, 65 (Ala. 2019). 
576 Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1048. 
577 Id. at 1049. 
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that states may find someone intellectually able when current medical 
diagnostic criteria would label them intellectually disabled. Instead, it is 
more reasonable to assume that the Court’s holding in Moore I suggests 
that states may find someone intellectually disabled who does not satisfy 
current medical diagnostic criteria for intellectual disabilities. In other 
words, states may depart from current medical standards for intellectual 
disabilities in order to be more lenient, but they may not add additional 
restrictions beyond the diagnostic criteria outlined in the DSM-5 or 
AAIDD-11, which would reduce the number of people who qualify as 
intellectually disabled according to current medical standards. 
Some legal scholars argue that regardless of the state the case is in, 
capital defendants should not have to provide evidence that their 
intellectual disabilities existed before age eighteen.578 The Supreme 
Court’s original rationale for exempting people with intellectual 
disabilities from execution in Atkins supports this assertion. In Atkins, 
the Court stated that intellectually disabled defendants are especially 
likely to receive the death penalty during the sentencing phase due to 
the 
possibility of false confessions, but also . . . the lesser ability of 
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of 
mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more 
aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able 
to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor 
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted 
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.
579
 
All defendants with subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive 
deficits, “by definition,”580 face these limitations at trial, regardless of 
whether they can demonstrate that their intellectual disabilities existed 
before adulthood. Accordingly, it is counterintuitive for the Court to 
have only intended for Atkins to protect a subset of the people identified 
as having an “enhanced” risk of execution.581 Based upon the Atkins 
Court’s rationale, the most reasonable interpretation of the Moore I 
 
578 See Updegrove et al., supra note 166 at 544–45. See also James W. Ellis, Mental 
Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 13–14 (2003). See generally Steven 
J. Mulroy, Execution by Accident: Evidentiary and Constitutional Problems with 
the “Childhood Onset” Requirement in Atkins Claims, 37 VT. L. REV. 591 
(2013). 
579 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002). 
580 Id. at 318. 
581 Id. at 320. 
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Court’s statement is that states may only depart from current medical 
standards if doing so is necessary in order to ensure the “reliability and 
fairness of capital proceedings against” them.582 As such, disregarding 
the age of onset requirement—established by the DSM-5 and AAIDD-
11—would seem to fall within this exception. 
The Alabama CCA quoted Moore I to note that “[t]he medical 
community’s current standards supply one constraint on States’ leeway” 
in defining intellectual disability because States must adhere to those 
standards.583 The Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Gates, also 
recognized the Moore I Court as “holding that states do not have 
unfettered discretion to reject medical community standards in defining 
[intellectual disabilities].”584 Similarly, the California Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “[t]he legal determination of intellectual disability 
is, of course, distinct from a medical diagnosis[.]”585 Moreover, the 
California Court wrote, “both our decisions and those of the United 
States Supreme Court [in Hall and Moore I] contemplate that the 
determination must be an individualized one, informed by the views of 
medical experts.”586 Thus, the California Supreme Court rejected the 
State’s argument that the factfinder had erred in evaluating Lewis for 
adaptive deficits “according to ‘the most current authority on [the] 
subject,’” instead of the now-outdated clinical manual originally used 
by the Atkins Court.587 In its holding, the California Supreme Court 
asserted that Moore I did not eliminate all ability for states to define 
intellectual disabilities, however, it noted that in creating those 
definitions states were prevented from disregarding current medical 
standards, as detailed in the most up to date clinical manuals. 
In Quince v. State, the Florida Supreme Court cited the Moore I 
Court’s reasoning that “Hall indicated that being informed by the 
medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated in 
the latest medical guide” in order to justify ignoring the Flynn effect.588 
The Florida Supreme Court contended that it was immaterial that the 
 
582 Id. at 307. 
583 Carroll I, 300 So. 3d 51, 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 
1039, 1053 (2017)). 
584 State v. Gates, 410 P.3d 433, 435 (Ariz. 2018). 
585 In re Lewis, 417 P.3d 756, 766 (Cal. 2018). 
586 Id. at 766–67. 
587 Id. at 766. 
588 Quince v. State, 241 So. 3d 58, 62 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 
1049 (2017)). 
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AAIDD organization had recently published a book that “now 
advocate[s] the adjustment of all IQ scores in Atkins cases that were 
derived from tests with outdated norms to account for the Flynn 
effect.”589 When the Florida Court disregarded the Flynn effect in this 
case, Quince’s IQ scores were rendered above 70 even after accounting 
for the SEM.590 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that he did 
not meet the first prong for intellectual disabilities.591 Moreover, the 
Florida Supreme Court had previously held, “[i]f the defendant fails to 
prove any one of these [three] components, the defendant will not be 
found to be intellectually disabled.”592 The Court, therefore affirmed 
that, “because Quince failed to meet the significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning prong (even when the SEM [was] taken into 
account), he could not have met his burden to demonstrate that he is 
intellectually disabled.”593 
The issue of state discretion is further complicated due to the fact 
that the DSM-5 itself recognizes the Flynn effect as one of the “[f]actors 
that may affect test scores,” which could reasonably be construed as 
confirming that the Flynn effect is indeed part of current medical 
standards.594 Critics who oppose the ramifications of adopting this view 
will likely justify their position by noting, as the Florida Supreme Court 
did, that the Moore I Court “indicated that being informed by the 
medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated in 
the latest medical guide.”595 Whether APA and AAIDD publications—
apart from the clinical manuals themselves—qualify as current medical 
standards is undoubtedly gray and requires clarification from the Court. 
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court evidently considered the 
publication in question, which recommended adjusting IQ scores to 
 
589 Id. The book in question, notes that “Not only is there a scientific consensus that 
the Flynn effect is a valid and real phenomenon, there is also a consensus that 
individually obtained IQ test scores derived from tests with outdated norms must 
be adjusted to account for the Flynn effect, particularly in Atkins cases.” AM. 
ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, THE DEATH PENALTY AND 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, 160 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015). Florida’s 
Supreme Court noted the defense based its argument on this passage by partially 
quoting it in its opinion. Quince, 241 So. 3d at 61. 
590 Quince, 241 So. 3d at 60–61. 
591 Id. at 62. 
592 Id. (quoting Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 812 (Fla. 2016)). 
593 Id. 
594 See DSM–5, supra note 180, at 37. 
595 Quince, 241 So. 3d at 62 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)). 
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account for the Flynn effect, to be part of current medical standards 
since it cited Moore I’s caveat that states do not need to follow 
everything written in the manuals.596 Consequently, the Florida 
Supreme Court must have erred when it disregarded what it seemingly 
recognized as part of current medical standards to determine that Quince 
was not intellectually disabled.597 
In Rodriguez v. State, the Florida Supreme Court observed that the 
circuit court considered the expert for the state the “most credible” when 
he “testified that according to his tests, Rodriguez was malingering and 
that none of his IQ scores below 70 were reliable.”598 Consequently, the 
circuit court discounted evidence presented by the expert for the 
defense, including “an IQ [test] score of 64.”599 Because the circuit court 
prioritized the state expert’s opinion over the defense expert’s, 
Rodriguez alleged that the “credibility findings made by the circuit court 
contradict medical standards detailed in a publication of the 
[AAIDD].”600 The Court disagreed that “credibility findings are 
improper when they conflict with medical standards,”601 because Moore 
I indicated that “being informed by the medical community does not 
demand [state] adherence to everything stated in the latest medical 
guide.”602 
 
596 The Moore I Court appears to have given the states discretion to broaden Atkins 
protections so that they may find capital defendants intellectually disabled even if 
they do not fully satisfy current medical standards. This discretion, however, does 
not permit states to find capital defendants intellectually able when current 
medical standards would consider them intellectually disabled. See Updegrove et 
al., supra note 166, at 542 (“[A]ny state that found a capital defendant 
intellectually able who would meet the criteria for intellectual disability under the 
DSM–5 or AAIDD–11 would contradict the current medical consensus.”). 
597 Quince, 241 So. 3d at 63 (“For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order 
denying Quince’s renewed motion for a determination of intellectual disability as 
a bar to execution.”). 
598 Rodriguez v. State, 219 So. 3d 751, 757 (Fla. 2017). 
599 Id. at 754. 
600 Id. at 756. Specifically, Rodriguez argued that “[m]edical standards indicate that 
experts cannot accurately evaluate adaptive functioning in a prison setting[,]” id. 
at 757, and that the Florida Supreme Court was wrong to assess “both long-term 
and current adaptive functioning” because it “encourages the unreliable practice 
of evaluating defendants in prison.” Id. Florida’s Supreme Court disagreed, noting 
that “the circuit court considered more than just adaptive functioning testing 
conducted in prison.” Id. at 758. 
601 Id. at 756. 
602 Id. (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)). 
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Finally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged that 
states retained some degree of discretion when it quoted the Moore I 
Court as saying, “Hall indicated that being informed by the medical 
community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest 
medical guide. But neither does our precedent license disregard of 
current medical standards.”603 Thus, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
understood Moore I to signify that “[the] medical community’s current 
standards supply one constraint on State’s leeway [in enforcing 
Atkins].”604 
F. Lay Stereotypes 
Courts from six different states have interpreted Moore I to mean 
that they may not rely on lay stereotypes about intellectual disabilities. 
The Alabama CCA, for example, understood the Moore I Court to have 
“held that States may not create their own factors for accessing [sic] 
adaptive deficits if those factors deviate from clinical standards and, 
instead, rely on ‘lay perceptions of intellectual disabilit[ies].’“605 The 
Court did not, however, allege that the circuit court relied on lay 
stereotypes about intellectual disabilities when deciding the case.606 
In People v. Woodruff, the California Supreme Court considered 
whether the state attorney engaged in misconduct when he informed 
jurors of the following: 
[the defense] counsel told you that your opinion or people’s opinion 
of whether or not Mr. Woodruff is mentally retarded doesn’t matter. 
But that’s not true. If it didn’t matter, you wouldn’t be asked to make 
this finding. If we only wanted professionals to come in here and 
make the decision, there would be no need for a jury. Your opinion 
does matter. That’s what we’re asking you to do . . . . And I submit 
this to you: If a person doesn’t look retarded or act retarded, it’s 





603 Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 377 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Moore I, 137 S. 
Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)). 
604 Id. at 378 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017)). 
605 Carroll I, 300 So. 3d 51, at 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Moore I, 137 S. 
Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017)). 
606 The Alabama CCA was not considering the issue of whether the circuit court 
relied on lay stereotypes when assessing intellectual disabilities. The CCA merely 
raised the issue as one factor that limits states’ discretion. 
607 People v. Woodruff, 421 P.3d 588, 649 (Cal. 2018). 
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In reviewing the case on appeal, the California Supreme Court noted 
that the Moore I Court wrote, “the medical profession has endeavored 
to counter lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled . . . . Those 
stereotypes, much more than medical and clinical appraisals, should 
spark skepticism.”608 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court 
stated, “[a]ssuming without deciding that the comment was erroneous, 
we conclude the error was harmless because it was said in passing and 
the prosecutor went on to review the evidence, including the experts’ 
findings, to support his contention that defendant was not intellectually 
disabled.”609 Because the California Supreme Court did not consider 
“the prosecutor’s comments as a whole” to be problematic, it ruled that 
the “defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.”610 
The Florida Supreme Court considered Moore I to forbid using the 
Briseno factors because they “had no medical or legal authority to 
support them, and they reflected a misinformed layperson’s 
understanding of [intellectual disabilities].”611 The court did not, 
however, judge the post-conviction court to be in violation of Moore I, 
because “current medical understanding served as the basis for the 
rejection of Wright’s claim, which differentiates this case from Moore 
[I] where the [Texas] CCA relied on outdated medical standards and lay 
perceptions of [intellectual disabilities].”612 
As part of her dissent from the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
majority opinion in Johnson v. State, Justice Stith summarized the 
Briseno factors as “ask[ing] counsel and family members to give 
anecdotal impressions of whether the person, essentially, has behaved 
how they would expect an intellectually disabled person to behave.”613 
Moore I, Stith asserted, “rejected this sanctioned use of anecdotal 
impressions of lay individuals,” and instead “held [that] states should 
require clinical evaluations of adaptive behaviors[.]”614 The majority 
found that Johnson alleged that he received incompetent legal 
representation because his counsel did not realize, based upon his 
interactions with Johnson, that Johnson was intellectually disabled.615 
 
608 Id. at 649 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017)). 
609 Id. 
610 Id. at 649–50. 
611 Wright II, 256 So. 3d 766, 774 (Fla. 2018). 
612 Id. at 775. 
613 Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 916 (Mo. 2019) (Stith, J., dissenting). 
614 Id. 
615 Id. at 905 (majority opinion). 
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Stith, in turn, argued that “[t]he issue is not that his counsel should have 
recognized his intellectual disabilities through his interactions with Mr. 
Johnson – as previously discussed, Moore I and Moore II reject use of 
lay perceptions as a permissible basis for determining intellectual 
disability.”616 Accordingly, Stith contended that the majority failed to 
properly understand Johnson’s claim, which in reality focused on his 
counsel’s woeful ignorance of capital punishment law, as it pertained to 
intellectual disabilities, and his inattention to expert testimony 
suggesting Johnson was intellectually disabled.617 
In Commonwealth v. Cox, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
conceded that, in light of Moore I, the PCRA court erred because “courts 
should be guided by the prevailing diagnostic and assessment tools and 
principles rather than lay perceptions of what constitutes intellectual 
disability.”618 The court qualified the Commonwealth’s reasoning, 
noting “[t]hat is not to say that lay testimony about factual observations 
of an individual’s behavior is not relevant to an expert’s assessment of 
behavioral deficits.”619 The Pennsylvania court determined that “the 
PCRA court relied on the apparent failure of the lay witnesses to act on 
their asserted perceptions of Appellant’s deficits to discount the 
existence of those deficits. This is squarely at odds with Moore I’s 
admonition against focusing on non-clinical lay perceptions.”620 In 
other words, because lay people around Cox did not treat him as 
intellectually disabled, the PCRA court regarded this as evidence that 
he was, in fact, not actually intellectually disabled. The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania then highlighted how the Moore I Court “particularly 
disproved reliance on the Briseno factors as an attempt to impose a 
 
616 Id. at 922. (Stith, J., dissenting). 
617 Justice Stith also wrote that “[t]he United States Supreme Court [in Moore I and 
Moore II] has twice reversed a death penalty conviction when a court based its 
determination of lack of intellectual disability on the court’s personal observations 
of the defendant rather than on scientific and medical criteria.” Id. at 909. Here, 
Stith appears to be implying that Johnson’s attorney committed a glaring error by 
assuming, based solely on their personal interactions, and despite medical 
evidence to the contrary, that Johnson was not a person with intellectual 
disabilities. Stith thought this error violated Moore I and Moore II. Thus, even 
attorneys who are “professionals” cannot substitute their own judgment and 
forego an examination when determining whether their client is intellectually 
disabled. This is also an example of relying on lay stereotypes rather than current 
medical standards. Id. at 910–11. 
618 Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 386 (Pa. 2019). 
619 Id. at n.14. 
620 Id. at 387. 
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consensus of the citizenry about who should be eligible for the death 
sentence rather than criteria accepted in the professional and medical 
community.”621 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
concluded that the PCRA court: 
relied on the Briseno factors to conclude the absence of intervention 
by the lay witnesses was a reason to conclude an absence of any 
deficits. This reliance is clearly erroneous in light of Moore [I]. The 
ability of lay persons to recognize intellectual disability, let alone 
know what steps to take to secure a diagnosis for supportive 
services, is not a part of the professional diagnostic criteria that 
courts have been directed to employ.
622
 
Justice Alcala, in her dissent from the Texas CCA’s Majority 
opinion in Battaglia v. State, wrote Moore I taught that, when evaluating 
capital defendants for intellectual disabilities, “courts should not resort 
to stereotypes about the intellectually disabled, but should instead look 
to current medical/clinical appraisals to determine whether a particular 
person meets the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability.”623 This 
same principle, she advocated, should apply with equal force to 
competency-for-execution evaluations, because on remand the Panetti 
Court ordered the trial court to show deference to the “conclusions of 
physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts in the field[.]”624 
Lastly, when concurring with the Texas CCA’s Majority opinion in 
Ex parte Wood, Justice Newell described Moore I as, “not[ing] that we 
are supposed to avoid lay perceptions and stereotypes regarding 
intellectual disability.”625 Newell did not, however, allege that the 
Majority opinion relied on lay stereotypes about intellectual disabilities. 
G. Miscellaneous 
Courts from four different states cited Moore I in a context other 
than previously discussed. In State v. Rodriguez, for example, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s observed that it was “not 
persuaded . . . that Moore [I] has any bearing on the intellectual 
disability issue that defendant has actually raised, which is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set the jury’s verdict with 
 
621 Id. at 388. 
622 Id. 
623 Battaglia v. State, 537 S.W.3d 57, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (Alcala, J., 
dissenting) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017)). 
624 Id. (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007)). 
625 Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 
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respect to the intellectual disability issue aside.”626 As a result, although 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina admitted that the “defendant did 
present sufficient evidence to support a determination that he should be 
deemed exempt from the imposition of the death penalty on intellectual 
disability grounds,” it refused to overturn the jury’s finding that 
Rodriguez was not intellectually disabled because the state expert’s 
testimony “tend[ed] to support a contrary determination,” and the issue 
ultimately “was a matter for the jury rather than for this Court.”627 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Batts, 
cited Moore I to establish that the term “mental retardation” used in 
Atkins held the same meaning as the term “intellectual disabilit[ies]” 
used in subsequent Supreme Court cases.628 In Dellinger v. State, 
Dellinger contended that, because “determinations of intellectual 
disabilit[ies] [had] expanded greatly, requiring consideration of many 
more factors than those considered at the time of his trial in 1996[,]” he 
was entitled to a new ruling on his intellectual disabilities.629 The 
Tennessee CCA acknowledged that Moore I motivated Dellinger’s 
petition, since it was the Supreme Court’s latest ruling on intellectual 
disabilities at the time he filed the petition.630 The court, however, 
dismissed the argument, declaring that the cases Dellinger cited, 
including Atkins, Hall, and Moore I, constituted “changes in the law that 
occurred several years after his trial.”631 
In its Ex parte King decision, the Texas CCA denied King’s petition 
for a stay of execution. Justice Keasler dissented, and proclaimed that 
[i]n light of this Court’s recent earnest, but ultimately unsuccessful, 
attempts to implement new Supreme Court precedent in death-
penalty cases [(Moore II)], and especially in light of the horrible 
stain this Court’s reputation would suffer if King’s claims of 
innocence are one day vindicated . . . I think we ought to take our 




626 State v. Rodriguez, 814 S.E.2d 11, 28 n.5 (N.C. 2018). 
627 Id. at 28. 
628 Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 448 n.20 (Pa. 2017). 
629 Dellinger v. State, No. E2018-00135-CCA-R3-ECN, 2019 WL 1754701, at *3 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2019). 
630 Although the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals issued its ruling on April 17, 
2019, Dellinger presumably filed his petition prior to the United States Supreme 
Court ruling in Moore II on February 19, 2019. 
631 Dellinger, 2019 WL 1754701, at *3. 
632 Ex parte King, No. WR-49,391-03, 2019 WL 1769023, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Apr. 22, 2019) (Keasler, J., dissenting). 
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As part of an unpublished opinion, Ex parte Long I, the Texas CCA 
“determined that applicant’s execution should be stayed pending further 
order of this Court” due to Moore I, which represented “new law.”633 
The Texas CCA ruled again in Ex parte Long II ordering the trial court 
to convene “a live hearing to further develop evidence and make a new 
recommendation to this Court on the issue of intellectual disability” 
following its previous suspension of Long’s sentence after Moore I.634 
Beyond this, the Texas CCA cited Moore I to justify a stay of execution 
in several other unpublished opinions, including Ex parte Segundo,635 
and Ex parte Williams,636 where the court also ordered a live hearing on 
the issue of William’s alleged intellectual disabilities. 
In Ex parte Wood, the Texas CCA noted that Moore I prompted its 
review of Wood’s case, but “conclude[d] that no further record 
development or fact findings [were] needed and that Applicant [was] 
not entitled to relief.”637 As the Texas CCA explained, “[t]he Moore 
decisions changed the legal analysis for reviewing intellectual-disability 
claims in Texas, but Applicant’s evidence relating to intellectual 
disability is already in the record.”638 When dissenting from the Texas 
CCA’s unpublished opinion in Petetan v. State, Justice Keller asserted 
that Petetan’s petition failed to “raise a claim based upon Moore v. Texas 
[I], and it [did] not make any claim relating to the Briseno factors—
despite the fact that Moore [I] was decided shortly after we handed 
down our opinion in this case.”639 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the time since the Supreme Court of the United States delivered 
its Moore I decision in 2017, and follow-up Moore II decision in early 
2019, state courts have cited these opinions to address a variety of issues 
 
633 Ex parte Long, NO. WR-76,324-02, 2017 WL 3616644, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Aug. 21, 2017). 
634 Ex parte Long, NO. WR-76,324-02, 2018 WL 3217506, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 
June 27, 2018). 
635 Ex parte Segundo, NO. WR-70,963-02, 2018 WL 4856580, at *1 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Oct. 5, 2018). 
636 Ex parte Williams, NO. WR-71,296-03, 2018 WL 2717039, at *2 (Tex. Crim. 
App. June 5, 2018). 
637 Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 679–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 
638 Id. at 681. 
639 Petetan v. State, NO. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 4678670, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 
18, 2017) (Keller, J., dissenting). 
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related to evaluating intellectual disabilities in capital cases. Some of 
these issues are relatively straightforward, with state courts either 
properly applying Moore I or Moore II or willfully disregarding their 
instruction under the guise of misunderstanding. Other issues, however, 
highlight gray areas that require further clarification from the Court. 
Table 4 presents a list of issues raised by state courts post-Moore I 
broken down according to whether: (1) the Supreme Court has already 
provided clear guidance on the issue; or (2) additional clarification is 
required from the Court. Until such a time as the Supreme Court 
addresses the issues listed in the latter category, they are likely to 
continue requiring state courts’ attention with some regularity. 
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V. APPENDIX 
Table 1. List of State Court Cases in the Twenty-Eight Death Penalty 





Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) 
Carroll v. State, 300 So. 3d 51 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) 
Ex parte Lane, 286 So. 3d 61 (Ala. 2018) 
State v. Carroll, 300 So. 3d 59 (2019)  
Graham v. State, 299 So. 3d 273 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) 
Arizona 1 State v. Gates, 410 P.3d 433 (Ariz. 2018) 
Arkansas 1 Lard v. State, 2020 Ark. 110, 595 S.W.3d 355 
California 2 
In re Lewis, 417 P.3d 756 (Cal. 2018) 
People v. Woodruff, 421 P.3d 588 (Cal. 2018) 
Florida 4 
Glover v. State, 226 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 2017) 
Rodriguez v. State, 219 So. 3d 751 (Fla. 2017) 
Quince v. State, 241 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 2018) 
Wright v. State, 256 So. 3d 766 (Fla. 2018) 
Georgia 1 Cawthon v. State, 830 S.E.2d 270 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) 
Idaho 0  
Indiana 0  
Kansas 1 State v. Thurber, 420 P.3d 389 (Kan. 2018) 
Kentucky 1 Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2018) 
Louisiana 0  
Mississippi 2 
State v. Russell, 2015-KA-00245-SCT (Miss. 2017) (en 
banc) 
Carr v. State, 2017-CA-01481-SCT (Miss. 2019) 
Missouri 1 Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2019) 
Montana 0  
Nebraska 1 State v. Vela, 900 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 2017) 
Nevada 2 
Mulder v. State, 422 P.3d 1231 (Nev. 2018) (unpublished 
table decision) 
State v. Covington, 433 P.3d 1252 (Nev. 2019) 
(unpublished table decision) 
North 
Carolina 
1 State v. Rodriguez, 814 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 2018) 
Ohio  3 
State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St. 3d 139, 2019-Ohio-2284, 140 
N.E. 3d 616 
State v. Jackson, 2020-Ohio-4015, 157 N.E. 3d 240 
State v. Jackson, 2020-Ohio-4914, No. 108558, 2020 WL 
6075698 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2020) 
Oklahoma 0  
Oregon 1 State v. Ryan, 396 P.3d 867 (Or. 2017) 
Pennsylvania 3 
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) 
Commonwealth v. VanDivner, 178 A.3d 108 (Pa. 2018) 
Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371 (Pa. 2019) 
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South 
Carolina 
1 State v. Blackwell, 801 S.E.2d 713 (S.C. 2017) 
South Dakota 0  
Tennessee 1 
Dellinger v. State, No. E2018-00135-CCA-R3-ECN, slip 
op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2019) 
Texas 17 
Battaglia v. State, 537 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) 
Ex parte Davis, No. WR-40,339-09, 2017 WL 6031852 
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2017) 
Ex parte Jean, No. WR-84,327-01, 2017 WL 2859012 
(Tex. Crim. App. June 28, 2017) 
Ex parte Long, No. WR-76,324-02, 2017 WL 3616644 
(Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017) 
Ex parte Sosa, No. AP-76,674, 2017 WL 2131776 (Tex. 
Crim. App. May 3, 2017) 
Petetan v. State, No. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 4678670 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017) 
Ex parte Cathey, WR-55,161-02, 2018 WL 5817199 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2018) 
Ex parte Guevara, No. WR-63,926-03, 2018 WL 2717041 
(Tex. Crim. App. June 6, 2018) 
Ex parte Henderson, WR-37, 658-03, 2018 WL 4762755 
(Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2018) 
Ex parte Lizcano, No. WR-68,348-03, 2018 WL 2717035 
(Tex. Crim. App. June 6, 2018) 
Ex parte Long, No. WR-76,324-02, 2018 WL 3217506 
(Tex. Crim. App. June 27, 2018) 
Ex parte Segundo, No. WR-70,963-02, 2018 WL 4856580 
(Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018) 
Ex parte Williams, No. WR-71,296-03, 2018 WL 2717039 
(Tex. Crim. App. June 5, 2018) 
Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) 
Thomas v. State, No. AP-77,047, 2018 WL 6332526 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2018) 
Ex parte King, No. WR-49,391-03, 2019 WL 1769023 
(Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2019)  
Ex parte Milam, No. WR-79,322-02, 2019 WL 190209 
(Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2019) 
Utah 0  
Virginia 0  
Wyoming 0  
Total Cases 45  
 
Table 2. Interpretations of Moore I and Moore II by State Courts in the 
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Alabama Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arizona No No No No 
Arkansas -1 - - - 
California Yes Yes Yes No 
Florida Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Georgia Yes No No No 
Idaho - - - - 
Indiana - - - - 
Kansas Yes Yes No No 
Kentucky Yes Yes No No 
Louisiana - - - - 
Mississippi Yes Yes Yes No 
Missouri Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Montana - - - - 
Nebraska Yes No No No 
Nevada Yes No Yes No 
North Carolina No No No No 
Ohio  - - - - 
Oklahoma - - - - 
Oregon No Yes No No 
Pennsylvania Yes Yes Yes No 
South Carolina Yes No Yes No 
South Dakota - - - - 
Tennessee No No No No 
Texas Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Utah - - - - 
Virginia - - - - 
Wyoming - - - - 
Total Number 
of States 
13 10 9 4 
1Indicates state courts have not cited Moore I or Moore II or have issued 
opinions after submission of this Article. 
 
Table 3. Additional Interpretations of Moore I and Moore II by State 
Courts in the Twenty-Eight Death Penalty States. 
State 
5. Discretion Afforded 




Alabama Yes Yes No 
Arizona Yes No No 
Arkansas - - - 
California Yes Yes No 
Florida Yes Yes No 
Georgia No No No 
Idaho - - - 
Indiana - - - 
Kansas No No No 
Kentucky No No No 
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Louisiana - - - 
Mississippi No No No 
Missouri No Yes No 
Montana - - - 
Nebraska No No No 
Nevada No No No 
North Carolina No No Yes 
Ohio  - - - 
Oklahoma - - - 
Oregon No No No 
Pennsylvania Yes Yes Yes 
South Carolina No No No 
South Dakota - - - 
Tennessee No No Yes 
Texas No Yes Yes 
Utah - - - 
Virginia - - - 
Wyoming - - - 
Total # States 5 6 4 
 
 
Table 4. Summary of Issues Raised by State Courts Post-Moore I that 
are Either Clear or Require Additional Clarification from the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
U.S. Supreme Court Has Already Provided Clear Guidance 
1. Courts may not require a defendant to meet additional criteria to 
prove their intellectual disabilities beyond the diagnostic criteria found in 
the most recent versions of the DSM and AAIDD manuals (currently the 
DSM-5 and AAIDD-11). 
2. Clinicians may interview lay persons such as family members, 
friends, neighbors, teachers, employers, and others who knew the 
defendant as part of an intellectual disabilities evaluation, but courts may 
not rely on the testimony or opinions of non-clinicians to justify 
determining that a defendant is not intellectually disabled. 
3. Courts may not base determinations of a defendant’s intellectual 
disabilities on their alleged adaptive strengths, even if those strengths are 
perceived to be directly related to a specific, relevant adaptive deficit. 
Courts may only focus on the defendant’s adaptive deficits, not their 
strengths, when evaluating their adaptive functioning. 
4. Courts may not rely on the defendant’s functioning while in prison 
to justify determining that they are not intellectually disabled. 
5. Courts may not prohibit defendants from presenting evidence of 
their adaptive deficits, regardless of how high their IQ score(s) is/are. 
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6. Courts may not disregard evidence of adaptive deficits by attributing 
those deficits to another cause besides intellectual disabilities. 
7. Courts may not, under any circumstances for any reason, use a 
standard error of measurement less than +5/-5 for a defendant’s IQ test 
scores, or narrow the range provided by this standard error of measurement 
after applying it to the actual IQ test score. 
8. Courts may not disregard IQ test scores based on how long ago the 
test was administered if the test in-question was considered to meet current 
medical standards at the time it was administered. 
9. Courts may not rely on lay stereotypes about intellectual disabilities. 
10 Courts may not interpret the failure of the defendant’s family 
members, friends, neighbors, teachers, employers, or others who knew the 
defendant to treat them as intellectually disabled as evidence that the 
defendant is, in fact, not intellectually disabled. 
Requires Additional Clarification from the U.S. Supreme Court 
1. Does the Court consider the Flynn effect to be part of current 
medical standards? If the Court does, do states have to adjust defendants’ 
IQ scores to account for the Flynn effect? 
2. Do defendants who demonstrate subaverage intellectual functioning 
and adaptive deficits, but cannot provide evidence that these existed before 
age 18 or during the developmental period, qualify for Atkins protections? 
3. Do courts have to rely on current medical standards when evaluating 
defendants for competency-to-be-executed? 
4. What does the Court mean when it says that states do not have to 
follow everything written in the most recent clinical manuals? 
5. Does the Court consider other publications from the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), besides the DSM-
5 and AAIDD-11, respectively, to be part of current medical standards? If 
the Court does, do states have to abide by these current medical standards 
as well? 
 
